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A b s t r a c t 
On General Multi-Quadratic Function Field Extensions in the GHS Attack 
Ahmad Lavasani 
To date, elliptic curves offer the most efficient cryptographic solution. Particularly 
efficient among elliptic curves, are those defined over binary composite finite fields, such 
as GF((2r)n). These curves were no longer considered secure when, in 1998, Gerhard 
Frey innovated a concept which paved the road for the GHS attack. The idea behind 
the GHS attack is to map the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over such a curve 
to an equivalent DLP over the jacobian of another curve, defined over the smaller field 
GF(2r). 
In this thesis, we study the theoretical structure of the GHS attack for elliptic 
curves defined over fields of arbitrary characteristics. We study the GHS attack using 
general quadratic extensions for elliptic curves defined over composite fields of even 
characteristic and we estimate the genus of resulting function field. We also implement 
the GHS attack and present some computational results. 
Keywords : GHS Attack, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Function Fields. 
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Resume 
Sur les extensions multi-quadratiques des corps de fonctions dans l 'attaque GHS 
Ahmad Lavasani 
Jusqu'a present, les courbes elliptiques offrent la solution cryptographique la plus 
efficace. En particulier, les courbes elliptiques qui sont definies sur des corps binaires 
comme GF((2r)n) sont encore plus efficace. Ces courbes ne sont plus considerees secu-
ritaires apres l'innovation de l'idee de l'attaque GHS par Gerhard Frey en 1998. L'idee 
principale de l'attaque GHS est de transferer le probleme du logarithme discret (PLD) 
sur une courbe elliptique de cette famille a un PLD equivalent sur la jacobienne d'une 
autre courbe qui est definie sur le corps le plus petit GF(2r). 
Dans ce memoire, nous etudions la structure theorique de l'attaque GHS pour les 
courbes elliptiques definies sur les corps de n'importe quelle caracteristique. Nous etu-
dions l'attaque GHS en utilisant des extensions quadratiques generates pour les courbes 
sur les corps de caracteristique paire et nous estimons le genre de la courbe. Nous 
presentons aussi le resultat de nos implementations de l'algorithme de GHS. 
M o t s Cles: Attaque GHS, Cryptographie sur les Courbes Elliptiques , Corps de Fonctions. 
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Preface 
In 2005 I was a research assistant of Prof. Taraneh Eghlidos in Cipher Lab of Sharif 
ERC. I was assigned the task of comparing the efficiency of the arithmetic of different 
elliptic curves for processors with limited resources. The result of my implementation 
was unanimously in favor of elliptic curves over finite field extensions with composite 
degree. I wrote a report and I recommended them for their efficiency [ELS06]. A 
week later, after submitting my report, I leafed through a guide for choosing elliptic 
curves for cryptography. It was suggested in the guide, that those finite fields are not 
recommended for cryptographic purposes, as they are subject to Weil Descent attack. It 
is not a good feeling to submit something and then find evidence against it. I felt a mix 
of sadness and curiosity. I was determined to know what this attack was, that ruined 
the pleasure of using those nice curves. I immediately submitted a research proposal to 
Dr. Eghlidos to study the Weil Descent attack. I should thank her for accepting it and 
for her support in that research [EGL07]. In the short period of time that I had, I got 
acquainted with the attack, but I had still a long way to study it. 
When I began my Master's in Concordia, I didn't feel like leaving my research 
half unfinished. I talked to my supervisor, Prof. Chantal David, about my personal 
attachment to GHS attack. She was very kind to accept my proposal, even though she 
had another proposal for me and the GHS attack was not her main interest. I would like 
to thank her, not only for accepting my proposal, but also for her continuous support; 
for reading papers with me line-by-line and for going through the proofs together, for 
her help in solving my financial problems, and for reading and correcting my messy 
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thesis drafts line by line. Above all, I should thank her for thinking with me about the 
problems I faced, which I think is very important point. 
I also should thank Ann-Marie Agnew, our kind graduate assistant of the Math 
Department of Concordia University, for her continuous support during my two years 
of Master's study. 
I am thankful to the other members of the thesis committee: Prof. David Ford, 
Prof. Hershy Kisilevsky and Prof. Francisco Thaine, who agreed to evaluate my work 
under time pressure. 
On the path to preparing this work I am indebted to several people who, either 
listened to my problems and/or suggested solutions, including: Ferenc Balogh, Marco 
Bertola, Noam Elkies, Florian Hess, Jorge Jimenez Urroz and Nicolas Theriault. 
I should especially thank my linguist friend Natalie Kershaw who, by helping me 
with the grammar of this thesis, also proved her theory in the disability of the human 
brain in learning new language after losing its neuro-plasticity. I should also thank 
Valerie Hudon for helping me with the french abstract. 
I would like also to thank my uncle, Abbas Beheshti and my aunt for helping me 
financially in the application and visa processes. 
Last but not least, I would like to express my appreciation to Pickle who almost 
constantly kept me company while I was writing my thesis, even though occasionally I 
had to bribe him with pieces of carrot to keep him interested. 
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1.1.1 Algebraic geometry 
In the ancient past, it was too difficult for the Greeks to look at algebra and geometry 
as two different fields of mathematics since they were thinking about algebra "geomet-
rically". Rather than "calculating" with numbers they were "measuring" magnitude and 
searching for relations. Multiplying two values meant computing the area that two 
"lengths" make. Therefore the Greeks considered area as a magnitude of a different 
type. This made the notion of polynomials not very meaningful for them [DD85]. 
However, this geometric view of algebra helped them to excel in algebraic geometry 
in that very early age. The intensive usage of the geometric methods can be found in 
"Konika" of Apollonius of Perga (262-190 BCE) in his thorough study of conic sections. 
Half a millennium later, Diophantus of Alexandria (about 200- about 284) wrote his 
series of Arithmetica. He was aware of the group operation on the points of elliptic 
curves and used this operation to find new rational points on these curves. This was 
probably the first time in history that elliptic curves appeared in the literature [vdW83]. 
Omar Kayyam (1048-1122) was the first one who made a clear distinction between 
"Numerical Algebra" and "Geometrical Algebra" and tried to prove some of Euclid's 
theorems using purely numerical quantities. Nevertheless, his algebra was mainly geo-
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metric; for example, he solved cubic equations by intersecting conies [DD85]. Following 
Kayyam, algebra and geometry started to grow in different directions. Mathematicians 
started avoiding geometric methods when studying algebraic problems. In this way, the 
reunification of algebra and geometry was postponed until the 19th century. 
In the late 18th and early 19th century, prominent mathematicians such as Leonhard 
Euler (1707-1783), Joseph Lagrange (1736-1813) and especially Adrien-Marie Legendre 
(1752-1833) tried unsuccessfully to find solutions for indefinite elliptic integrals. Their 
failed efforts did, however, lead to the theory of "elliptic functions", which are double 
periodic functions on complex plane. These functions were the first instance of "abelian 
varieties" later named as such by Solomon Lefschetz( 1884-1972). Niels Abel (1802-1829) 
and Carl Jacobi (1804-1851) independently generalized this theory for higher periods. 
These works led to the invention of another class of abelian varieties called "jacobian of 
hyperelliptic curves" which are one of main objects studied in our work. 
During the 19th century, algebraic methods in geometry made considerable progress, 
mainly due to the work of Bernhard Riemann (1826-1866) and his successors [DD85]. 
Algebraic geometry was reborn as mathematicians started to use geometric methods to 
study "abelian functions" again. It was Weil in the 1940s who gave abelian varieties 
their modern foundations in the language of algebraic geometry. 
Abelian varieties are geometric objects, such as curves and surfaces, which are alge-
braic groups at the same time. At the end of the 20th century, abelian varieties became 
the intersection point between an ancient branch and a recent branch of mathematics: 
algebraic geometry and cryptography. 
1.1.2 Cryptography 
Less than 3 decades after the birth of cryptography as a science through Claude Shan-
non's seminal paper [Sha48] on information theory, cryptography reached an inflection 
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point. Martin Hellman discovered that a public-key cryptosystem would be possible if 
there exists a problem which is hard in one way and easy in other way. A Public-key 
cryptosystem is a system which allows everybody to send an encrypted message to Alice 
that no one else can decrypt but Alice. It is sometimes called asymmetric cryptography. 
Ralph Merkle, suggested to Hellman that the "Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)" in 
Z/pZ is a good choice [DH76]. 
Since then, the DLP has become a popular problem in designing public key cryp-
tosystems. The popularity of the DLP in cryptography motivates both cryptographers 
and cryptanalysts. While cryptographers have been searching for groups in which solv-
ing the the DLP is hard, cryptanalyzers, on the other hand, have been trying to find 
faster algorithms to solve the DLP on those groups. It was there that algebraic geometry 
and cryptography were tied together. 
As abelian varieties provide a rich supply of algebraic groups, they attracted the 
attention of the cryptographers in their search for harder instances of the DLP. Neal 
Koblitz [Kob87] and Victor Miller [Mil86] (independently) suggested using the group 
of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field. The contribution of algebraic ge-
ometry to cryptography, however, is wide-reaching and did not stop at that point. 
Koblitz later also proposed the use of the jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve for the 
same purpose [Kob89]. Other examples are torus-based cryptography proposed by Al-
ice Silverberg and Karl Rubin [RS03] or the usage of a generalized jacobian by Isabelle 
Dechene [Dec05]. 
On the other side of the race, cryptanalysts were trying to develop algorithms to 
solve the DLP over different groups. Victor Shoup proved [CFA06] that a generic DLP 
solver (according to the definition of generic DLP solver in Theorem 19.2 [CFA06]) 
can not be less complex than 0(V'Group Size). To solve the DLP faster, cryptanalysts 
started to look for algorithms which exploit the structure of the underlying group. At 
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the end of the 70's, the index calculus algorithm was introduced for solving the DLP 
over the multiplicative group of Z/pZ in subexponential time, based on the idea of 
A. E. Western and J. P. C. Miller. This idea can be generalized to the multiplicative 
group of any finite field. Later in 1999, Leonard Adleman, Jonathan DeMarrais and 
Ming-Deh Huang designed the index calculus algorithm for jacobians of hyperelliptic 
curves [ADH94]. To date, index calculus algorithms are the strongest algorithms for 
solving the DLP in many groups. 
In spite of the successful application of the index calculus attack to many groups, 
there are still some groups on which this attack is not applicable. The failure to find a 
fast algorithm for solving the DLP on these groups has been the motivation for studying 
isomorphism attacks. These attacks try to find an efficiently computable map from a 
group with no known fast DLP solver to another group which admits a fast DLP solver 
such as index calculus. In the presence of such a map, one can solve the DLP in the 
range group to solve the DLP in the domain. 
The group of points on a general elliptic curve is a prominent example of groups 
for which no successful subexponential DLP solver has been found yet. As a result, in 
order to solve the DLP problem on elliptic curves, mathematicians try the option of the 
isomorphism attack. Two examples of an isomorphism attack which are applicable to 
special groups of elliptic curves, are [MV091] and [Sma99], however neither of these is 
applicable to a significant number of curves. 
1.1.3 T h e G H S Attack 
The difficulty of the elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP) made elliptic curves very interesting 
objects for cryptography. Among all kinds of elliptic curves, the cryptographers were 
particularly interested in curves defined over binary finite fields with a composite exten-
sion degree , i.e. GF((2r)n), because of the fast algorithms existing for the arithmetic on 
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these fields. Examples of practical interest in these curves can be found in the internet 
protocol standard RFC4212 [Orm98] and also in [PSR97], [GP97], [PFR98], [AMV93] 
and [PFSR99]. 
As the elliptic curves over composite finite fields were gaining popularity, Gerhard 
Frey took mathematical cryptography to a higher level of sophistication by opening a 
new trend of isomorphism attacks for elliptic curves over composite fields [Kob07]. He 
proposed a method to map the DLP over elliptic curves defined over composite fields to 
the DLP over a higher-dimensional abelian variety, which is called the Weil restriction 
of the curve. In this way solving the DLP over the resulting variety became equivalent 
to solving the DLP over the curve [Fre98]. 
In [GS99], Nigel Smart and Steve Galbraith studied different aspects of the method 
in the case of characteristic 2. They proposed a way to find an algebraic curve over 
the Weil restriction and a way to transform the DLP from the elliptic curve to the new 
curve. They experimentally discovered that the resulting curve is usually hyperelliptic. 
Later Pierrick Gaudry, Florian Hess and Smart used the idea of [GS99] but worked 
with the function fields of the curves instead of the curves themselves. The basic idea 
in [GHS02b] was to extend the function field of the elliptic curve iteratively to reach 
a function field corresponding to a curve suitable for an index calculus attack. This 
became known as the GHS attack. The function field is extended with a series of 
Artin-Schreier extensions and the authors were able to prove that the function field 
resulting from the extension process belongs to a hyperelliptic curve. As the index 
calculus for the jacobian of an hyperelliptic curve is a well studied problem [CFA06], 
the GHS attack provides a way to solve the DLP over such elliptic curves with exactly 
computable complexity. 
The method of [GHS02b], although it was applicable to elliptic curves defined over 
the majority of composite fields, resulted in an easier DLP only for a small proportion 
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of these curves. This difficulty arises because most of the time, the genus of the ex-
tended function field is very large, which means that the jacobian of its defining curve 
would be large. In such situations, the subexponential index calculus algorithm for this 
jacobian cannot out-perform the exponential algorithm over the original elliptic curve. 
In [GHS02a] Galbrith, Hess and Smart devised a method to solve this problem to some 
extent. If the elliptic curve under attack results in an unreasonably large genus curve, 
the method tries to find an isogenous elliptic curve which results in a lower genus under 
the GHS method. 
Hess in [Hes04] showed that using more general forms of Artin-Schreier extensions 
can improve the performance of the attack by finding a function field of smaller genus. 
However, when one uses this general form of the GHS attack, there is no guarantee that 
the resulting curve is hyperelliptic. As the complexity of the index calculus attack for 
a general (non-hyperelliptic) curve is not a well-studied subject, the exact complexity 
of the attack proposed in [Hes04] cannot be determined. 
1.2 Outline 
In the generalized GHS attack of [Hes04], Hess used Artin-Schreier extensions to build 
the extended function field. However, by choosing other extensions for special elliptic 
curves, we might end up at a less complex DLP using the GHS construction. 
In this work, our main goals are to explain the GHS attack as it is introduced 
in [Hes04] and [BSS05] with more emphasise on studying the function field structure of 
the attack. We want also to study the GHS attack when general quadratic extensions 
are used to construct function fields. We also propose a way to rank the elements of a 
finite field according to their security against GHS attack. 
In Chapter 2, we present the jacobian of an algebraic curve and the DLP problem 
over it. We also present the index calculus algorithm for the jacobian of curves. Finally, 
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we discuss the applicability and complexity of this algorithm to the jacobian of different 
curves to rank the difficulty of the DLP over them. 
In Chapter 3, we explain the general algorithm of the GHS attack as it is explained 
in [Hes04], [Die03] and [BSS05]. We discuss each step of the attack separately and 
we explain the algebraic properties of the function fields we encounter in the attack. 
We also discuss conditions under which the attack can be carried out theoretically 
(independent of its efficiency). 
In Chapter 4, we limit ourselves to elliptic curves over fields of even characteristic. 
In this chapter we want to evaluate the security of different field extensions against the 
GHS attack. However, unlike [Hes04], we do not limit ourselves to the Artin-Schreier 
extensions and we generalize some of results related to the complexity of GHS attack 
proved in [Hes04], [BSS05], [MQ01] and [MT06] for more general quadratic extensions. 
Using this information, we study the security of elements of finite fields with prime 
extension degree. We also propose an algorithm to find weak elements of a field against 
GHS attack. 
In Chapter 5, we include and explain our implementation both for the attack and 
for the weak element finder. We present some examples of running these implementa-
tions and we discuss their results. We also present the evaluation of security of finite 
extensions of prime degree of even characteristics finite fields. 
In Chapter 6, we discuss the result and the impact of the GHS attack on the cryp-
tographic world. We also discuss future work that can be done to improve the GHS 
attack in more general situations. 
The beauty of the GHS attack, independent of its application to the real world, 
is in its deep interaction between two exciting fields of mathematics, namely algebraic 
geometry and cryptography. 

CHAPTER 2 
Discrete Logarithm Problem over 
Jacobian of Curves 
The problem of solving the logarithm can be discussed in any group. However, the 
difficulty of solving discrete logarithm vs. the efficiency of cryptographic algorithms 
guides cryptographers to choose one group over another. 
Miller and Koblitz independently proposed the idea of using the group of points on 
an elliptic curve in cryptography [Mil86][Kob87]. Unfortunately, the fantastic property 
that the points on elliptic curves form a group, does not hold for other kind of curves. 
Nonetheless we can assign to any curve a group called the jacobian. In all the following, 
a "curve" will be a non-singular complete, projective curve as defined in Definition 
V.10.3 [Lor96]. 
The index calculus attack provides a subexponential algorithm to solve the DLP 
for the jacobian of curves of large genus in several cases. The idea behind the GHS 
attack is to map the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem(ECDLP) to the jacobian 
of another curve and try to break the new DLP using index calculus attack. 
In this chapter, we define and study the jacobian group and we study the DLP on 
the jacobian. We explain the index calculus attack and the different ways that index 
calculus strategies can be applied to different types of jacobians. 
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2.1 Divisor class group and jacobian 
The set of points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group. The group structure is 
based on the fact that every straight line meets the curve in 3 (not necessarily distinct) 
points P\,P2, Pz in the projective plane. Looking at each line and defining P\+P2+P3 = 
0, the addition of two points can be defined as Pi + P2 = —P3- This fact comes from 
the famous Bezout theorem in algebraic geometry: 
Theorem 2.1.1 (Corollary 1.7.8 in [Har97]) Bezout theorem Let C\ and C2 be 
two distinct curves in P2 , having degrees d\, d2 respectively and let C\ PI C2 = 
{Pu...,Pn}. Then 
n 
J > ( C i , C 2 : Pi) = eM2 
where i(Ci,C2 '• Pj) is the multiplicity of intersection of C\ and C2 at Pj. 
For curves of higher genus (and then higher degree), instead of considering each 
point as an element of the group, we consider the formal sum of points as an element 
of the group. 
Therefore any formal sum of points would be an element of our group. Each instance 
of such formal sum of points is called a divisor: 
Definition 2.1.2 Divisor (Over a smooth curve): The divisor group of a curve 
C, denoted by Div(C) is the free abelian group generated by the points of C. Thus if 
n 
P\,..., Pn be points on curve C and rii € Z, then D := 2~_,niPi J5 called a divisor over 
i = l 
C. 
Similar to the case of elliptic curve where the lines that intersect the curve were 
defining the relations on the group, we need to defines the same kind of relations over 
this group to obtain a group which is useful for our purpose. However, we need to 
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consider more general objects than just straight lines to have a well-defined group. 
These general objects are rational functions defined in the function field of the curve. 
Definition 2.1.3 ([Sil94]) Function field and rational functions Suppose that K 
is a field and C is a curve defined by irreducible equation p(x,y) € K[x,y]. The integral 
domain K{x,y]/p(x,y), denoted by K[C], is called the coordinate ring of C. The field 
of fractions of K[C], denoted by K{C), is called the function field of C. Elements of 
K(C) are called rational functions. 
In this thesis we only consider the case that K is a finite field. This assumption 
holds for all cryptographic applications. 
We consider the intersection points of each rational function in the projective plane 
with the curve as a defining relation for the group. In this way we can define the divisor 
class group as the quotient of Div(C) by one of its subgroup (defined below). 
Definition 2.1.4 (Definition 1.4.3 [Sti93]) subgroup of principal divisors To 
each rational function f(x,y) in K(C), we associate a divisor 
div(f) = J2 vf(Pi)Pi 
Pi€C 
where Vi(Pi) is the signed multiplicity of Pi over f (either as a pole or zero). Such a 
divisor is called a principal divisor. The set of principal divisors forms a group which 
we denote by PK{C) • 
Definition 2.1.5 Divisor Class Group The divisor class group of C is 
Cl{C) := Div{C)/VK{c). 
We denote the divisor class represented by divisor D, by [D]. 
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Definition 2.1.6 (1.3 [Sil94]) Degree of a Divisor The degree of a divisor D = 
deg(D) := ^ v{ 
PteC 
The degree of a principal divisor is 0 (See II.6.10 [Har97]) and therefore the degree 
depends only on [D] and not on the representing divisor D. This mean that the degree 
is well-defined over Cl(C) as well. 
Definition 2.1.7 Jacobian of C For curve C we define following set as "The degree 
0 part of divisor class group" as follows: 
Cl°(C):={{D}eCl(C)\deg([D}) = 0} 
Till now, to define a divisor we have considered points on C with coordinates defined 
in K, the algebraic closure of the constant field of C. For cryptographic purpose, 
however, it is important to confine ourselves for the divisor which are defined over the 
constant field. 
n 
Definition 2.1.8 Divisor defined over K We say that divisor D := 2_.niPi l's 
i = l 
defined over K if 
n 
Da = Y1 nipi = D f°r dl a e Gal(K/K) 
z = l 
In this way we define the jacobian of C defined over K as follows: 
Definition 2.1.9 The jacobian of curve C defined over K denoted by Cl°(K(C)), is a 
subgroup ofCl°(C) which contains all divisor class [D] such that [D] is equivalent to a 
divisor class [DQ] such that Do is defined over K. 
It can be shown that Cl°(K(C)) is a finite subgroup of Cl(C) and therefore one can 
study the DLP on this group.As the jacobian of curve C defined over K is the finite 
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group that we are always interested in, from now on we simply call it the jacobian of 
C. 
2.2 Complexity of the DLP over the jacobian of a curve 
The complexity of the general attack to solve a DLP over a general cyclic group depend 
only on the size of the group. Indeed, the best general attack known for solving the 
DLP over a general cyclic group is Pollard's p algorithm [MV096]. The complexity of 
the attack is 0(y/n) in which n is the order of the group. This is better than the 0(n) 
exhaustive search, but it is still is exponential in the bit-length of n. As the complexity 
of the general attack only depends on the group size it is important to estimate the size 
of the group whose security is to be analyzed. 
As we said, estimating the size of the jacobian of a curve is the first step in evaluating 
its security. Corollary VIII.6.3 [Lor96] gives an estimate for the size of Cl°(K(C)). 
Theorem 2.2.1 Suppose C is a curve of genus g, defined over a finite field K of size 
q. Then: 
(l-VQf9<\Cl°(K(C))\<(l + ^)2^ 
Using the above theorem we conclude that the size of the jacobian of a curve is of 
order q9. Consequently, the complexity of the Pollard's p attack for the jacobian of 
curve C is 0{q9/2). This means that the best known general attack to the DLP over 
Cl°(K(C)) is exponential in term of its genus. Actually this was one of the advantages 
of hyperelliptic curve cryptography over elliptic curve cryptography [CFA06]. 
By studying the size of the group Cl°(K(C)), we dealt with assessing the resistance 
of the DLP over this group against general attacks. However, the strongest attack in 
many practical cryptographic intersting situations is the index calculus attack. For 
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this reason in the remainder of this section, we study the index calculus attack and its 
applicability to the Cl°{K(C)) for different curves C. 
2.3 Index calculus attack 
The family of index calculus algorithms are the most powerful algorithms known to solve 
the DLP over different groups. In many groups, including the multiplicative group of 
finite fields, the index calculus method gives a subexponential algorithm to solve any 
instance of the DLP. 
Despite of all successes of the index calculus attack during recent years, there is still 
no index calculus attack to solve the DLP over a general elliptic curve in subexponential 
time. In the next sections, we describe the index calculus algorithm in general and for 
specific groups. 
2.3.1 The algorithm 
Let G —< P > be an additive cyclic group and suppose that Q € G is given. The DLP 
is to find n such that 
Q = nP. (2.1) 
As we mentioned before, index calculus is not applicable to a generic cyclic group. The 
group needs a special property which we call the factor base property. 
2.3.1.1 Factor base property 
There is a formal technical definition for the factor base, which is beyond the scope of 
this work. We refer the interested reader to [CFA06]. However, we give a more intuitive 
definition here parallel to the idea of [HMV03]. 
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Definition 2.3.1 Factor base Let G be an abelian group. A factor base B = 
{P i , . . . , Pm} C G for the index calculus algorithm is a (finite) subset of G such that a 
randomly chosen element Q G G can be efficiently expressed in terms of element of B 
as 
m 
Q = Yjmpi (2-2) 
with a significant probability. 
The elements in the factor base should be chosen in a way to increase the efficiency 
mentioned in Definition 2.3.1. The word "efficiently" in the above definition could be 
defined precisely. However, we shall only give an intuitive idea of what efficiency means 
here. For a given factor base, and for several random <5's, we want to find m values 
of nj's such that Q = X)2a niPi- Therefore, the elements of the factor base should 
be special elements such that this operation is "efficiently" possible and it should be 
possible for a "significant" number of randomly chosen Q's. 
The elements of the factor base are called primes as the prime elements of Z were 
used as factor base elements to solve the DLP in (Z/pZ)* when index calculus was 
applied for the first time. An element Q £ G is called B-smooth if it is expressible in 
terms of elements of factor base B as in (2.2). 
We say that a group G has the factor base property if there is a fast algorithm to 
find an efficient factor base for the DPL problem in G. 
The efficiency of a factor base B depends on its "size" and the "probability of finding 
a .B-smooth element". There is a natural trade-off between the size and the probability 
that a random element is B-smooth. The greater the factor base, the more likely that 
a random element is i?-smooth. On the other hand, the index calculus needs to gather 
more relations (as defined in following section) to solve the DLP and this decreases 
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the efficiency of the algorithm. However, the smaller the factor base, the smaller the 
probability that a randomly chosen Q be a .B-smooth. If this probability is low, the 
index calculus algorithm wastes time on choosing a lot of useless elements until it finds 
enough .B-smooth elements. Therefore the definition of an efficient factor base is group-
dependent or even implementation-dependent. 
The problem of finding an efficient factor base for a specific group is non-trivial. In 
other words for each group, we need a specific method to find an efficient factor base. 
For the case (Z/pZ)*, it is easy to prove that the primes form an efficient factor base. 
On the other hand, in the case of the group of points on a general elliptic curve, the 
question has still not been solved. 
Under the assumption of having an efficient factor base, the index calculus algorithm 
can be applied to any group without difficulty. Algorithm 2.1 describes the index 
calculus for a general additive group when the factor base is found: 
A l g o r i t h m 2.1 INDEX CALCULUS - GIVEN THE FACTOR BASE 
Require: : P, Q and B := {P i , . . . , Pm} an efficient factor base. 
Ensure: : Find n such that Q = nP. 
l: for i in { 1 , . . . , m + N} such that iV is a small integer do 
2: repeat 
3: Generate (Regenerate) random 6j 
4: until biP is B—smooth 
5: Qi *- biP 
6: Compute e;j for 1 < j < m such that Qi — b{P — Y^jLi ei,jPj 
7: end for 
8: A^ (e,-j) 
9: b <- (6,-) 
10: Solve the linear system Ax = b (Now we have Xj such that Pj = XjP.) 
ll: repeat 
12: Generate random r 
13: until rQ is B—smooth 
14: Compute rj for 1 < j < m such that rQ — Y^JLi rjPj — Yl^Li rjxjP 
l S . - n - r - ^ E ^ i W ) 
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The N extra 5-smooth elements are chosen in the loop in Line 1 of Algorithm 2.1 
to make sure that the linear system is solvable with high probability. The Line 15 of 
Algorithm 2.1, is valid because Q — nP, so for a random r, we have rQ = rnP = 
(EJLi W ) P . 
The basic idea of the algorithm is as follows: First one can solve the DLP for the 
factor base quite easily and then using that information one can solve the DLP for the 
specific element Q. As the index calculus is applicable as soon as a factor base is found 
for a specific group, the question of solvibility of the DLP in a specific group using index 
calculus boils down to the question of finding a suitable factor base in that group. In 
the following sections, we discuss the problem of finding a suitable factor base in the 
groups that will be involved in the GHS attack. 
2.4 Index calculus for the DLP over the jacobian of curves 
In order to find a suitable factor base we need to study the structure of Cl°(K(C)). In 
this section we first discuss the problem of finding the factor base for a special family 
of curves called "hyperelliptic curves" [CFA06]. Then we explain how to find the factor 
base on a general curve. At the end, we discuss the case where a factor base cannot be 
found with current knowledge. 
2.4.1 Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves 
In the case of hyperelliptic curves we have a nice representation for the elements of 
divisor class group. This representation called the Mumford representation, can be 
defined according to Proposition 2.4.1: 
Proposit ion 2.4.1 (VII.l [BSS05]) Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus gc de-
fined over a field K with equation Y2 + H(X)Y = F(X). Then the elements of the 
18 Chapter 2. DLP over the jacobian of curves 
jacobian of C that are defined over K are in one-to-one correspondence with the pairs 
of polynomials (a(X),b(X)) with coefficients in K, such that deg(b) < deg(a) < gc and 
such that the polynomial a is monic and a divides b2 + bH — F. 
We denote the divisor class that corresponds to a pair (a(X),b(X)) by div(a,b). 
The factorization of the polynomial a(X) is compatible with the divisor group operation 
and this leads to the idea of defining a prime element in the divisor class group of a 
hyperelliptic curve 
Definition 2.4.2 Let [D] be the divisor class corresponding to div(a, b) by Proposi-
tion 2.4.1- [D] is said to be prime if the polynomial a is irreducible over K. 
Under this condition an efficient factor base can be defined for Cl°(K(C)) 
Definition 2.4.3 Let B be an integer. The set of all divisors div(a,b) such that a 
is irreducible in K and is of degree < B, make a factor base for index calculus on 
Cl°(K(C)). A divisor D € Cl°(K(C)) is B-smooth if it can be written in terms of 
element of this factor base. 
In [BSS05] it is shown that if the genus of the hyperellptic curve C is large enough 
(compared to the size of K), using above factor base, index calculus can provide a 
subexponential attack. 
2.4.2 Jacobian of a general curve 
As it is mentioned in Definition 2.1.2, a divisor in Cl°(K(C)) can be represented as 
the sum of finite many points. This idea is parallel to the idea of primes in Z. In Z 
every integer can be uniquely written as a product of primes. In the same way, we can 
write each divisor as a sum of closed points or prime divisors [Die08]. In the index 
calculus algorithm, we expect that the elements of factor base belong to the group 
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under attack. However, for a prime divisor class [P] we may have deg(P) 7^  0 and 
therefore [P] g Cl°(K(C)). To cure this problem, we fix a divisor class [Do] of degree 
1 and whenever we face such a problem we consider divisor class [P] — deg(P)[Do] m 
the factor base instead. 
Using this factor base, it is shown in [Die08] that the index calculus algorithm is 
subexponential in the genus of curve C as the genus of C approaches infinity. 
2.4.3 Infeasibility of index calculus method for elliptic curves 
Despite of several attempts, there is still no practical factor base for the DLP on elliptic 
curves. 
The factor base of Definition 2.4.3 is useless when one looks at an elliptic curve as 
a hyperelliptic curve of genus 1. With the Mumford representation, all divisors in the 
class group of an elliptic curve have a(X) polynomial (in the div(a, b) representation of 
the divisor) of degree < g = 1. This means that they all are irreducible polynomials 
by definition. Therefore all the divisors in the class group are prime and should be 
employed in the factor base which is absurd. 
Looking at elliptic curves as general curves also does not help. As stated in Theorem 
III.3.4 [Sil94], for elliptic curve E, we have E 9* Cl°(E). Therefore, all elements of 
Cl°(E) are primes, which is the same problem as the case of hyperelliptic factor base. 
Another approach is to lift the elliptic curve defined over a finite field to an elliptic 
curve defined over Q and search for the factor base elements there. The Xedni-Calculus 
attack mentioned in [SilOO] is an example of such an effort. 
However, in contrast to the fact that lifting an element of (Z/pZ)* to Q is a trivial 
fact, it is not the case for points on an elliptic curve. It is claimed in [HMV03] that 
this approach fails because there is no efficient algorithm to lift a point from an elliptic 
curve defined over a finite field to Q. In addition we are only able to lift those points 
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to Q efficiently whose canonical height over lifted curve (over Q) is small. However it 
is proved that the number of such points on a general elliptic curve is negligible. 
Another possible approach is lifting the curve to a local field as well [Gau04]. 
However, [Gau04] introduced a factor base for the same family of curves that we 
study in this thesis. The method is based upon Weil Descent attack which is also a 
basis for the GHS attack. Although the method is less efficient than the GHS attack, 
it can be applied in more general cases. 
The lack of a general index calculus attack for elliptic curves was the primary moti-
vation for mapping the group of points of elliptic curves to other groups were the index 
calculus is feasible. The GHS attack which we discuss in next chapter is an example of 
such attack. 
CHAPTER 3 
GHS Attack and Its Function Field 
Structure 
In previous section, we studied the DLP over different curves. We also studied 
the attacks which are applicable to them. The difference in the complexity of the 
DLP solvers over different groups, encourages studying the so-called "isomorphism at-
tacks" [HMV03]. The isomorphism attacks try to find efficiently computable maps 
between a group with a "hard" instance of the DLP and an "easier" one. Obviously, the 
underlying instance of the DLP should stay invariant under these maps. Weil [MV091] 
and Tate [FR94] pairing attacks are some examples of this category. 
The purpose of this work is to study another instance of this category of attacks, 
called the GHS Weil Descent attack. The primary motivation for designing the GHS 
attack was the absence of subexponential algorithm to solve the DLP over the group 
of points of an elliptic curve. In this attack, we try to find a homomorphism from the 
group of points on an elliptic curve to the jacobian of another curve such that: 
• The solution of the DLP remains the same under the homomorphism. This means 
that we can use the solution of the DLP in the jacobian of the new curve to solve 
the DLP over the elliptic curve. 
• The DLP in the new group, is easier to solve (usually provided by an index calculus 
attack). 
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The GHS attack, first proposed in [GHS02b], exploits the relationship between func-
tion fields of curves to find a map to transform the DLP from the elliptic curve group 
to the jacobian of a new curve. In this section, we first study the general process of 
the GHS attack for finding the DLP transformer map using the relation between the 
function fields. After that we focus on each function field involved in the attack and 
we study its properties. Finally we describe the homomorphisms which transform the 
DLP to an easier instance. 
It is worthy of mention that the GHS attack can be applied to solve the DLP on the 
jacobian of hyperelliptic curves [Die03], [Hes04]. In this work, we restrict ourselves to 
the case of elliptic curves. In this case, the group of the points of the elliptic curve E and 
the jacobian of the elliptic curve Cl°(E) are isomorphic (See for example Proposition 
III.3.4 [Sil94]).We will always use the notation Cl°(E) for the group of the points of E. 
3.1 The GHS attack in nutshell 
The ultimate goal of the GHS attack is to find a homomorphism between the jacobians 
of two curves. This map should preserve the DLP. Suppose we want to attack curve E 
using curve C. The original DLP is to find n such that: 
[D2] = n[Di] where [D2], [A] <E Cl°(E) ~ E 
We want to find a homomorphism <f> such that: 
4>: Cl°(E) - • Cl°(C) 
The general process of finding such a homomorphism <f>, known as the GHS attack 
([GHS02b] and [Hes04]), is to find it by extending the function field of the curve under 
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attack. Let K(E) be the function field of the curve under attack. In the GHS attack 
the field K(E) is extended to F. The resulting field is a function field of another curve 
C (according to Proposition 3.3.5), so we have F = K(C). The function field extension 
K{C) needs to satisfy a series of criteria in order to transfer the DLP successfully. 
These criteria are discussed in Section 3.2. The GHS attack consists of an algorithm to 
extend K(E) and construct K{C). The extension process involves choosing a series of 
irreducible polynomials and adding their roots to K{E). The process of choosing such 
polynomials and constructing K(C) are discussed in Section 3.4. 
After finding K(C), we need a map to transfer the DLP to C. Since K(E) C K(C), 
the injection between these function fields induces a map between the ideal groups of 
their coordinate rings and consequently their jacobians. In this situation, any ideal in 
the coordinate ring of E can be regarded as an ideal in the coordinate ring of C, parallel 
to that, any divisor class in Cl°(K(E)) can be regarded as a divisor class in Cl°(K(C)). 
In this way we can map the DLP to Cl°(K(C)).This map is called the "Conorm map" 
in the GHS literature (for example in [GHS02b] and also in [Che51]). We will study 
the map in more detail in Section 3.6. 
The fact that the genus of K{C) is larger than the genus of K(E) makes the index 
calculus algorithm available to solve the DLP over Cl°(K(C)). However, as K{C) and 
K{E) has the same constant fields, while the function field K(C) is larger than K(E), 
solving the DLP over Cl°(K(C)), is harder than the original DLP, despite using index 
calculus. 
The whole scenario would be then useless, unless we can find a smaller constant 
field k C K on which C is defined. This is achieved by using a special automorphism 
a over K(C). We set F' := K{C)<a> in which by K{C)<<T> we mean the fixed field of 
a. In Section 3.3.4 we see that indeed F' has a smaller constant field. If k C K is the 
constant field of F' and Co is the curve for which F' = k(Co), we can solve the DLP in 
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Cl°(k(C0)). 
At this stage, we reach a smaller function field with a curve with higher genus. The 
last step is to find another map ip : Cl°(K(C)) —> Cl°(k(Co)) to transfer the DLP from 
Cl°(K(C)) to Cl°{k(C0)). For this part of the process we use the norm function from 
the large extentended field K(C) to the smaller subfield k(Co) fixed by a. The norm 
function induces a homomorphism between jacobian of C and jacobian of Co- We will 
discuss this function in Sections 3.6.3. 
In following sections, we study each step of the GHS attack in more detail. The 
most important step in the GHS attack is to find a suitable function field extension 
K(C). In next section we describe the criteria of function field K(C). In Section 3.3.1, 
we define the algebraic objects that we encounter in the GHS attack. 
In Section 3.3, we assume that we have the whole structure needed for the attack, 
and we study the properties of this structure. This would help us to prove that the 
GHS attack can successfully transform the DLP into an easier problem. 
In Section 3.4, we describe how to generally construct the extension K(C) which is 
needed for the attack. 
In Section 3.5, We discuss the genus of extended function fields K(C) and k(Co). 
In Section 3.6, We describe the homomorphism which transform the DLP from 
Cl°{K{E)) to Cl°(K(C)) and from Cl°(K(C)) to Cl°(k(C0)). 
3.2 Criteria in choosing the extended function field K{C) 
As we mentioned in previous section, the GHS attack consists of extending the function 
field of the elliptic curve to the function field of another curve C and then finding a 
subfield of K(C) on which the DLP is easier to solve. 
There are three main concerns in choosing K(C): 
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• Faithfulness of the DLP mapping As we discuss in Section 3.6, we always 
need to check that the homomorphism we use to transfer the DLP, does not have 
a large kernel. So, we should not use an extension of K(E) in which the induced 
map from Cl°(K(E)) —> Cl°(K(C)) has a large kernel. However, it is shown in 
Section 3.6.2 that this map seldom has a large kernel in a practical cryptographic 
case. Therefore, this concern does not really put a limitation on choosing the 
extension K(C). 
• Existence of a suitable field automorphism After constructing K(C), we 
use an automorphism a such that k(Co) = K(C)<a>, for some curve Co defined 
over k. 
In order for a to be effective in lowering the constant field of K(C), a should 
not fix K, otherwise, K C K(C)<a>, therefore K(K(C)<a>) = K(C)<a> which 
means that K is the constant field K(C)<a>. This means there k = Ka is a 
subfield of K. The GHS attack is then ineffective against curves defined over the 
prime field. 
Choosing a also defines the norm function of K(C)/k(Co). The norm function 
induces the homomorphism between the jacobians of the fields. We choose <r to 
ensure that we get a homomorphism with desirable small kernel. 
• The lowest genus possible The jacobian of curve Co is the group on which we 
aim to run the index calculus attack. As we will see in Section 3.5 the genus of 
Co is equal to the genus of C. As all index calculus algorithms known for solving 
the DLP over jacobians, are at best subexponential in the genus of the underlying 
curve, we want to find the extension with the smallest genus possible to increase 
the efficiency of the attack. On the other hand, we do not want that the genus 
of C be very small (1, 2 or 3) as there is no efficient index calculus algorithm for 
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the DLP over these curves. 
3.3 The general field theoretic structure of the attack 
In this section we discuss the properties of all fields involved in the GHS attack and 
their relationship to each other, i.e. the extensions in detail. We establish the notations 
and the definitions related to the GHS attack in Section 3.3.1. The new notation we 
develop in this section remains valid in the remainder of the thesis. 
The discussion in this section is more theoretical than the discussion in Section 3.4, 
which shows how algorithmically we can build the K{C). 
3.3.1 Notat ions and assumptions on structure of the GHS attack 
Assumption 3.3.1 Algebraic Structure of the GHS attack 
• E: the curve that we want to attack. Form now on we suppose that E is an elliptic 
curve. 
• K: a finite field of characteristics p, K is the constant field of K(E) and the field 
of definition of E. 
• F — K(C): is a regular finite extension of function field K(E) of degree dc/E := 
[K(C) : K(E)]. We fix a defining curve of this function field and we call it C. 
Also we require that K(C) has automorphism a as defined below. 
• a is an automorphism of K(C) that does not fix K. The existence of such a is 
necessary for the GHS attack. 
• n :— ord(a). 
• k C K is a subfield of K which is the constant field of K(C) 
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• F' — k(Co) = K(C)<cr> is the subfield of function field K{C) that is fixed by a. 
3.3.2 Fields K, k and extension K/k 
Let k be the subfield of K fixed by a (Assumption 3.3.1). By the fundamental theorem 
of Galois theory [Mor96], [K : k] = n. By theory of finite fields [Mor96], we know that k 
has pr elements for some integer r. Consequently \K\ = (pr)n. By the Corollary II.6.7 
of [Mor96], Gal(K/k) is cyclic of order n generated by the Frobenius automorphism of 
K/k. Therefore, by possibly replacing a by one of its powers, we can assume that O\K 
is the Frobenius automorphism of K over k. From now on, we denote the Frobenius 
automorphism of K/k with a as well, whenever it does not cause ambiguity. By the 
above discussion we know that: 
Va €K,a(a) = apr. 
The extension K/k is depicted in Diagram 3.1. 
K := ¥gn 
n Gal{K/k)=<a> 
k := ¥q:=pr 
Diagram 3.1: Extension K/k 
3.3.3 Extens ions K(z)/k(z), K(E)/K(z) and K{E)/k(z) 
The GHS attack proposes a special way to choose the extended function field K(C) as 
well as constructing the a automorphism. Although it is not the only way that one can 
achieve a suitable K(C) such that it satisfies the criteria of Section 3.2, it is a concrete 
way to do so. 
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The first step in building K(C) is to choose a rational subfield of K(C) [BSS05]. 
This means to choose any function z € K(E) and write the new equation of the curve 
in term of this function. This results in a new defining equation of the curve g(z,y). 
Choosing this element determines K{C), the whole algebraic structure and consequently 
the complexity of the attack. Therefore choosing the function z is considered as the 
most important step in implementing the attack on a special curve. 
In [GHS02b] and [Hes04], z is chosen such that K{E)/K{z) is an Artin-Schreier 
extension (of degree 2). We discuss this case in more detail in Section 4.5. In [Die03] 
and [The03], z is chosen such that K(E)/K(z) is a Kummer extension. As we want to 
study the general quadratic extensions in this thesis, we assume [K(E) : K(z)] = 2. 
After choosing z as above, we are able to define k(z) as well as K(z) as follows. 
Definition 3.3.2 Function z in the GHS attack Element z 6 K(E) is a transcen-
dental element over K such that K(E) is a quadratic elliptic extension of K(z) where 
K(z) is the rational function field in z over K. 
Let k(z) be the rational function field in z over k. It is easy to prove that K{z)/k{z) 
is a finite Galois extension of degree n with cyclic Galois group generated by an extension 
of the Frobenius automorphism of K/k such that it fixes z. Also we also have K(E) = 
K(z)[y]/g(z,y), which means K(E)/K(z) is an algebraic extension with degree d := 
\K{E) : K(z)] = degKrz\iyi(g(z,y)). As we limit ourselves to quadratic extensions, 
we know that d — 2. Therefore K(E)/k(z) is an algebraic extension and we have 
[K[E] : k(z)] = 2n. 
For the GHS attack, we also need to put an extra condition to assure that our attack 
would be successful. 
Assumption 3.3.3 The GHS Strong Assumption Let n = [K : k] = ord(a), and 
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2 := [K(E) : K(z)]. We assume that: 
(2,n) = l 
Remark. We close this section by emphasizing that the size of the orbit of y when a 
acts on Galois closure of K(E)/k{z) is of most importance in the GHS attack as you 
will be seen in Section 3.3.3.1. 
3.3.3.1 Function field K(C) and automorphism a 
In the GHS attack we want to define the function field K(C) as an extension of K(E). 
However, the definition of a function field in 2.1.3 is based on a defined curve. In the 
case of K(C) we do not build K{C) using an existing curve C. In contrast, we define 
it as an extension of K(E). Therefore we need a more general definition of a function 
field, which does not depend on the defining curve. 
Definition 3.3.4 (Definition 1.1.1. [Sti93]) Function field of one variable An 
algebraic function field F/K of one variable over K is an extension field F D K, 
such that F is a finite algebraic extension of K(x) for some element x € F which is 
transcendental over K. 
As in this thesis, we just deal with algebraic function fields of one variable, here after 
we simply use the term "function fields" to refer to them. Although these two definition 
of function fields seems different, in the case that K is a prefect field it is easy to prove 
that they are equivalent. 
Proposition 3.3.5 Let F be a function field over K in the sense of Definition 3.3.4, 
there is a curve C such that F = K{C). 
Proof. Given function field F, one can construct C as follows. As F/K(x) is a finite 
extension and K is prefect, Corollary 1.5.7 [Mor96], assures that F is a simple extension 
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of K(x), i.e. there exists y G F such that such that F = K(x, y). Let p(X, Y) e K[X, Y] 
be the irreducible polynomial of y over K(x). Let K{C) be the function field of the curve 
d 
C defined by p(X,Y). Now writing each element / 6 F as / = ^ / , ( x ) y 4 € /f(C) 
2=0 
define an isomorphism between F and K(C), and therefore -ft'(C) = F. 
a 
Proposition 3.3.5 allows us to talk about an algebraic extension of K(E) and call it 
K(C) without defining curve C a priori. In the GHS attack we define K(C) as follows. 
Definition 3.3.6 K(C) is defined to be the splitting field of K(E)/k(z). 
We can now define a easily. As K(C) is the splitting field of some extension, by 
definition K{C)/k(z) is normal. On the other hand K(z)/k(z) and K(E)/K{z) are 
separable and by Proposition 1.4.21 [Mor96] K(E)/k(z) is separable. By definition 
of separability, this means K{C)/k{z), the splitting field of K{E)/k(z) is separable. 
Therefore K(C)/k(z) is Galois. So we can look at Gal(K(C)/k(z)). We need to choose 
a such that it satisfies following condition: 
• ord(cr) = n 
•
 a\K(z) — Probenius automorphism of K(z)/k(z). 
We need to make sure that we are always able to find such a. Consider following 
exact sequence: 
1 - • Gel(K(C)/K(z)) -> Gal(K(C)/k(z)) -»• Gal(K(z)/k(z)) -» 1 (3.1) 
Let us examine the case when this sequence splits. According to Theorem VI.1.18 
[Hun03], we know that the above sequence splits if and only if 
Gal{K(C)/k(z)) ~ Ga\(K(C)/K(z)) x Gal(K{z)/k{z)) 
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In that case we can simply choose a € Gal(K(C)/k(z) = 1K(C)/K(Z) X aK{z)/k(z) which 
has order n. Therefore the fact that this sequence splits is sufficient for us to carry 
out the attack. For that it is sufficient that the elements of Gal(K(C)/K(z)) and 








Diagram 3.2: The series of function field extensions to reach K(C) 
According to Diagram 3.2, the sequence splits when (2d',n) = 1. By Assump-
tion 3.3.3 we knew that (2,n) = 1. Proposition 3.4.2 assures that using the GHS 
construction the above sequence splits. 
3.3.4 Extension K(C)/k(C0) 
Since curve C has higher genus than E, the index calculus attack is applicable to 
Cl°(K(C)). However, no matter what the genus of C is, if we run the index calculus 
attack on Cl°(K(C)), we always expect worse running time than running generic attacks 
on Cl°(K(E)) such as Pollard's p attack. This is because K(C) and K(E) both have 
the same constant field K. Although the index calculus attack is subexponential in 
genus of the curve under attack, it is fully exponential in the size of its constant field, 
i.e. O(q) if q is the size of the constant field. However, Pollard's p method takes 
only 0(^/q) < 0{q). This means that if we increase the genus while keeping the same 
constant field, we end up with a worse time for the attack. The whole point of the GHS 
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attack is to decrease the constant field size at the cost of not extending the genus too 
much. For this reason, we still need to transform the DLP to another curve whose genus 
is higher than E and at the same time its constant field is smaller than the constant 
field of E. 
To find this final function field to attack, we need to use the automorphism a we 
found in last section. Having a, we simply set F' := K(C)<a>. However to assure that 
index calculus is efficient on F' we need to prove: 
Proposition 3.3.7 K(C) is a constant field extension of F''. 
Proof. Suppose / 6 F' is a rational function. Since fa — f means that / is 
defined over k, and therefore F' is defined over k(z). This means that there exists a 
curve Co defined over k, such that F' = k(Co). Now we want to look at the function 
field Kk(Co). We know that the extending polynomial of K/k is irreducible over k(Co) 
as its roots are not fixed by a. However, these roots are in K C Kk{Co). Therefore 
[Kk(C0) : k(C0)] > n. Now considering the definition of k(C0) = K(C)<a> and the 
fact that ord(a) = n, we know [K{C) : k(C0)} = n, so K(C) = Kk(C0) = K(C0). 
Therefore K(C) is a constant field extension of k{Co). 
• 
As the constant field of F' is k, we can find a curve Co defined over k such that F' = 
k(Co). From now on we denote this function field as &(Co). Using Proposition 3.3.7, 
we know that K{C) = Kk(C0) = K(C0). 
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3.4 Algorithmic construction of K(C) and the automor-
phism a 
The Frobenius automorphism of Kjk is the heart of the GHS attack. This is the funda-
mental reason that there is no obvious way to generalize the GHS attack to prime fields 
as in that situation there is no Frobenius automorphism. We use this automorphism to 
find fc(Cb), a subfield of K{C). 
To emphasize the importance of the extended Frobenius automorphism, we remark 
that when this automorphism is determined (or equivalently z is chosen), the whole 
structure of k(Co) can be determined, including the genus of C which determines the 
difficulty (including the success/failure) of the attack. 
In Chapter 4, we discuss the problem of choosing a suitable z for the even char-
acterstic case. However here, we assume that we have chosen z as it is discussed in 
Section 3.3.3, and therefore we can compute the Frobenius automorphism <JK(z)/k{z)-
Therefore the goal of this section is to describe the algorithm which constructs the 
extension K{C) given z. 
To understand the process of constructing K{C) in [GHS02b] and [Hes04], one can 
look at the construction of K(E). Since yo := y is algebraic over K(z) of degree 2, 
we have the quadratic equation /(yo) = 0 such that f(Y) € K(z)[Y}. K{E) is simply 
K(E) := K(z)[Y]/f(Y). Now to extend K{E) we need another polynomial. 
l 
Definition 3.4.1 Let f(Y) = 'S^aiY1 e K[Y] be a polynomial and a be an automor-
t=0 
phism of K. We denote the action of a on f(Y) by 
e 
r(Y) = Y/a(ai)Yi. 
t=0 
Let f(Y) e K[Y] be a quadratic polynomial with root y0 G K{E) as defined above, 
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and let K0 := K{E). Let MY) := fa(Y). If MY) is irreducible over K0, then we add 
its root, yi, to KQ and we construct K\ := Ko(yi), otherwise K\ := K$. Continuing 
this procedure we can extend K(E) to K(C) with the desired properties. As a has 
order n, the procedure stops after at most n iterations. Algorithm 3.1 is the complete 
procedure of constructing K(C). 
Algorithm 3.1 CONSTRUCTING K(C) 
Require: f(Y) € K(z)[Y] be the defining equation of elliptic curve E such that 
f(yo) — 0, o~ be the Frobenius automorphism of K/k. 











KQ <- K{E) 
for all i such that 1 < i < n do 
fi(Y)^r'(Y)GK(z)[Y] 
if fi(Y) is irreducible over jKi_i then 
Ki <- KiMVi) s u c l 1 that /i(y,) = 0. 
else 




After generating K(C) using Algorithm 3.1 or equally using the theoretical proce-
dure discussed in Section 3.3.3.1, we need an element a € Gal(K(C)/k(z)) such that 
a has order n over K(C). This is because we want that \K(C) : K(C)<a>] = n. 
According to Proposition 3.4.2 such an element exists. 
Proposition 3.4.2 If n is odd and K(C) is constructed by Algorithm 3.1, there exists 
a which satisfies the conditions stated in Section 3.3.3.1. 
Proof. Using field theory we know: 
n-l 
{K(C):K(E)} = l[[Ki:Ki-1}. 
As deg(fai) = 2 for all i, [Ki : Kt-i] is either 2 or 1. Therefore d' = [K(C) : K(E)} = 2m 
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for some integer m. By Assumption 3.3.3 we know that (2, n) — 1, so (d', n) = (2m, n) 
1. This means that the sequence of (3.1) splits, which is sufficient for existence of a. 
• 
3.4.1 The magic number "m" 
In Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1, each time we face the question: is fa'(Y) irreducible over 
Ki-i or not? The number of times that we answer positively to this question, determines 
the difficulty of the GHS attack to E using the chosen subfield K{z). For that reason, 
we refer to it as the magic number associated to extension K{E)/K(z) and denote it 
by m as it is traditional in the GHS literature. Algorithm 3.2 computes the value of m 
along constructing K(C). 
Algorithm 3.2 CONSTRUCTING K(C) AND COMPUTING m 
Require: f(Y) G if(.2)[Y] be the defining equation of elliptic curve E such that 
f(yo) = o 











K0 <- K{E) 
m <— 0 
for all i such that 1 < i < n do 
fi(Y)^(fr(Y)€K(z)[Y} 
if fi(Y) is irreducible over -fQ-i then 
m <— m + 1 




Diagram 3.3 shows the procedure of generating K(C) using Algorithm 3.2. Finally 
we close this subsection by proving that Algorithm 3.2 construct K(C) according to its 
theoretical definition. 
Proposition 3.4.3 The field generated by adding yi,i = 0 , . . . , m to K(z) resulted from 
Algorithm 3.2 and the field K(C) defined in Definition 3.3.6 are isomorphic. 
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Kn = K(E)(y0,yi,y2, ...,ym) 
K2 = K(z)(y0,yi,y2) 
K^KMyoM) 
K0 = K(E) = K(z)(y0) 
K(z) 
Diagram 3.3: The series of function field extensions generated by algorithm 3.2 to reach K{C) 
Proof. First we want to show that K{C) contains the splitting field of m^(2)(y), i.e. 
all of its roots. As PE is not defined over any subfield of K(z), we know that Pg (y) 
are different for 0 < i < n — 1. We define 
M(Y):=l[PEi(Y) 
i=0 
As this polynomial is invariant under action of a, it is defined over k(z). On the other 
hand rnMz\{Y) \ M(Y) because y is a root of M(Y). Using the GHS algorithm we 
know that M(Y) has all of its roots in K(C), because the algorithm makes sure that all 
PEl (Y) (which are quadratic) are reducible before stopping. Now M(Y) is a polynomial 
of degree 2n because it consists of n quadratic factors, therefore M(y)|mfc(2)(F). This 
means that M(Y) = mk^{Y) and therefore K(C) is the splitting field of extension 
K(E)/k(z). 
• 
As the result of Proposition 3.4.3 we name both of these fields as K(C). Diagram 3.4 
shows the relation of all function fields involved in the GHS attack: 
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K{C) 
2 m - l 
K(E) k{C0) 
2 2 m 
K(z) : 
oo 
Diagram 3.4: The relation of function field extensions in the GHS attack 
3.5 The Genus of resulting curves 
The genus plays an important role in the complexity of attack. The final complexity of 
attack depend on two major facts, 
• The size of Cl°(k(C0)). 
• The effectiveness of index calculus attack over Cl°(k(Co)). 
Both of these parameters depends on the genus of the curve Co- As it is mentioned in 
Theorem 2.2.1, the size of Cl°(k(Co)) is of 0(q9) where g is the genus of Co- Therefore 
is exponentially related to the genus of Co- Also the type of index calculus attack to 
be chosen depend on the genus of CQ. 
As we generate K(C) explicitly and defined k(Co) as the fixed field of K(C) by a 
it is easier from a computational point of view to investigate the genus of K{C). The 
following proposition from [Ros02] shows that we merely need to study the genus of 
K(C) as it is equal to the genus of k{Co): 
Proposition 3.5.1 Let k be a prefect field and let K/k be a finite extension. Suppose 
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that k(Co) is a function field whose constant field is k. Let K(C) = Kk(Co) be a 
constant field extension ofk(Co). Then the genus of K{C) considered as function field 
over K is equal to the genus of k(Co). 
Therefore we only need to compute the genus of the curve C which we obtained 
through Algorithm 3.2. 
The genus of the extended function field, depends on the method of extending the 
function field of elliptic curve E. The genus can be computed in special cases when we 
extend K(E) using specific polynomials. Two specific methods are discussed for even 
and odd characteristics in [GHS02b][Die03]. However, in more general cases as dealt 
in [Hes04], we can merely find upper and lower bounds on the genus of C. 
Finding the genus of general extension in the GHS attack is still an open problem. 
In next chapter we study the situation when an Artin-Schreier extension is used to find 
the descend. In that situation the genus is computed in [GHS02b], [Hes04]. 
In next chapter we find an upper bound for the case p = 2. 
3.6 Mapping the discrete logarithm problem 
The focus of this work is on studying the suitable function field extensions for the attack. 
Nevertheless, the final goal is to solve the DLP which is responsible for the security of 
the cryptographic system. All the tedious search to find a suitable function fields would 
be useless, if we can not find a suitable map to transfer the DLP to a group where it 
is easier to be solved. In this regard, we devote this section to go through the mapping 
process. 
The function field structure is built in order to help us to find the suitable map which 
can transfer the discrete logarithm over the Elliptic Curve E (or equivalently over the 
divisor class group, Cl°(K(E))) to the discrete logarithm problem over Cl°(k(Co)). We 
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use the extension/subfield relations between K(E),K(C) and k(Co) to construct that 
map. This process consists of two steps: 
• Mapping a divisor in Cl°(K(E)) (or equivalently a point on E) to a divisor over 
Cl°(K(C)) 
• Mapping a divisor in Cl°(K(C)) to a divisor over Cl°(k(Co)). 
Both of these maps are derived using the relationship between function fields we 
built in this chapter. In following two sections we deal with these maps separately. 
3.6.1 Mapping the D L P faithfully 
Suppose we want to attack curve E using curve C. The original DLP is to find n 
such that [D2] = n[D{\ : [D2], [Di] € Cl°(K{E)) ~ E. Suppose we have found a 
homomorphism <f> such that 
4>: Cl°(K(E)) -» Cl°(K(C)). 
Now we have 
\D2)-n[D1] = 0 
=> <j>{[D2] - n[D1}) = 0 
=» <f>([D2]) - n^([A]) = 0 
In presence of such homomorphism, suppose that we have a feasible algorithm to solve 
the DLP 4>{[D2}) = m<f>{[Di]) over the Cl°(K(C)). By running that algorithm over 
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Cl°(K(C)) we obtain m such that: 
<f>([D2}) - m ^ p i ] ) = 0cp{K(O) 
=> <t>{[D2] - m[Di\) = Oci°(K(Q) 
=> [D2] - m[A] € Ker{4>) 
As 0 is a homomorphism, its kernel is a group. If we have g — \Ker(<f>)\, the order of 
this group, by lagrange theorem in group theory [Mor96] then we have 
g([D2] - m[Di]) = g[D2] - 0m[I>i] = 0clo{K{E)). 
On the other hand the DLP over Cl°(K(E)) says that 
\D2) - n[Di] = 0clo{K{E)) =¥ g([D2] - n[Di\) = g[D2] - gn{Dx} = 0CP(K{E)) 
Subtracting these two equations we get 
gnlDi] - gm[Di] - g(n - m)[A] = 0clo{K{E)) =» ordc,o(jr(B))([£)i]) | g{n - m) (3.2) 
However, if ord([Z?i]) as the generator of the DLP group is not a prime, the Pohlig-
Hellman attack is applicable [MV096] to the DLP on E, which break down the discrete 
logarithm in the Sylow subgroups of < [D\] > efficiently then deduce the DLP on E. 
As solving the DLP over each of those Sylow subgroups, actually consists of solving the 
DLPs over subgroups of prime order, the complexity of the problem reduces to the diffi-
culty of solving the DLP over a group whose number of elements is equal to the largest 
prime which divide | < [D\] > |. Therefore, it does not make sense to choose ord([£>i]) 
to be composite. In the other words if we choose ord([Di]) to be composite number we 
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increase the complexity of encryption/decryption process, however the security of the 
system remains as low as the time that we choose the group order as the largest prime 
dividing ord([£>i]). In this regard, we can safely assume that p = ord([Di]) is a large 
prime number. 
Now if p is a prime number, equation 3.2 results in p | g or p \ n — m. in the second 
case it means m = n{ mod p) and it means that we have solved the original DLP. On 
the other hand, if p \ g. This means that </> has a large kernel, because p should be 
large, (of order 0(2160)), to ensure the security of the system. So in search of such 
homomorphism to attack the Cl°(K(E)) we should keep away from homomorphisms 
with large kernel. 
In a nutshell, if we can find a map between the jacobians of two curves, under the 
condition that the map does not have large kernel, solving the DLP over the jacobian 
of the new curve, solves the original DLP as well. In this regard the goal of the attack 
is to find an algorithm to compute such a map. 
3.6.2 Mapping Cl°(K(E)) to Cl°(K(C)) 
Using the theory of function fields we have following theorem: 
Proposition 3.6.1 Let E/K and C/K be curves as defined in this chapter, such 
that K(E) C K(C) and X : K(E) '-* K(C) be the embedding map. Then there 
exists a morphism of curves (j> : C —* E which induce the group homomorphism 
4>* : Cl°(K(E)) - • Cl°(K(C)). 
Proof. First we need to build a map between curves using the embedding of the function 
fields. According to Theorem II.2.4 of [Sil94], let X(x) and \(y) be images oix,y € K{E) 
in K{C) respectively, in this regard we define <f> := (X(x),\(y)). We claim that ^ is a 
morphism of curves. Suppose that f(X, Y) 6 K[X, Y] is the defining equation of curve 
E, therefore we have f(x,y) = 0 6 K{E) => X(f(x,y)) = f(X(x),X(y)) = 0 6 K(C). 
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Now V(x,y) E C => <l>(x,y) = (X(x),\(y)) =• f(X(x),X(y)) = 0 => (A(x), Afo)) G £ . 
According to [Sil94][P.33], the morphism $, induces a group morphism (f>* such that: 
0* : Div(E) -> Div(C) 
<KQ) - VP<*-HQMP)(P) 
Proposition II.3.6 [Sil94] says that deg(<f>*(D)) = deg(4>)deg(D). Therefore <f>* maps 
degree zero divisors to degree zero divisors. So it is induce a map on Cl°(K(E)) —> 
C7°(tf(C)). 
• 
According to Proposition 3.6.1 We have following commutative diagram 
0 >• # ( £ ) —^Divo(K(E)) i Cl°(K(E)) 0 
4>* <£* <A* 
0 A"(C) —^Div0{K(C)) i C/°(K(C)) *• 0 
D i a g r a m 3.5: The map <j>* 
Therefore </>* can serve us as a map to transform the discrete logarithm problem 
from E to C. 
The chosen homomorphism to map the DLP in class groups is called "4>*" in [SH94], 
"TT*" in [MWZ96] and "Conorm" in [Che51] and [MTW04]. Moreover the literature on 
the GHS attack uniformly call it "Conorm" function as well. 
3.6.2.1 Preservat ion of the DLP under conorm map 
We found a homomorphism to map the class groups, however we should make sure that 
the solution of the mapped DLP over Cl°(K(C)) is a solution of the original DLP over 
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Cl°(K(E)). Suppose we try to solve the DLP for [P], [Q] € Cl°(K(E)), in which [P] 
and [Q] are the divisor classes corresponding to points P and Q respectively over curve 
E. The correspondence provided by the isomorphism between points on the elliptic 
curves and its jacobian. The DLP means we want to find s such that [Q] = s[P] in 
Cl°(K(E)). Instead we want to solve <f>*({P}), <f>*([Q]). 
Suppose the DLP under attack, is defined in a subgroup H < Cl°(K(E)) with prime 
order s. 
Therefore we transfer the problem to 4>*{H) and we want to solve the problem. 
As (f>* is a homomorphism, we know that ker((f>*(H)) < H therefore \ker(<f>*(H))\ | 
\H\. Now because H has prime order we can deduce that either ker(cj)*(H)) = 0 or 
ker{(f>*(H)) = H. 
In the first case we have ker{cj)*{H)) = 0, it means that (f>* is an isomorphism and 
the DLP is transferred faithfully. So, the solution of the DLP over Cl°(K(C)) is the 
same as the solution for Cl°(K(E)) and the subgroup 4>*(H) = H and particularly has 
the same order. In this case the DLP is preserved completely. 
In the second case, however, the whole subgroup is mapped to the identity element 
of Cl°(K(C)). In this case we lose the DLP completely. So the <t>* drags the whole 
subgroup to the kernel and therefore the DLP is not transformable to Cl°(K(C)) using 
Now we want to study under what condition we face the second case and conse-
quently a failure in our attack. To investigate the situation, we apply function, 4>* to 
the image of 0*. So in the undesirable case that (f>*{[P}) = 0 =» </>*(<^ >*([.P])) = 0. Now 
according to following proposition (proposition II.3.6 [Sil94]), </>* o<^>* can be simplified: 
Proposition 3.6.2 Let E and C be two curves and 4> : C —> E be a non-constant map 
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from C to E. Then for any divisor class[D] e Cl°(K(E), we have: 
^ o ^ ( p ] ) = [deg(^ )][JD] 
Therefore we have [deg(4>))[P] = 0, As [P] was not originally 0 divisor class (the 
identity element of the group), we see that P should be a [de(/(0)]-torsion point. By 
definition deg(<j>) = \K(C) : <j>*{K(E))}. In addition we know that </>* is simply embed-
ding of K(E) in K(C) so it means deg((f>) = \K{C) : (f>*{K{E))] = \K{C) : K(E)]. In 
Section 3.3.3.1 we chose K(C) so it would be the splitting field of K(E)/k(z). We used 
m different copies of K(E)/K(z) to construct K(C). So we have deg{4>) = \K(C) : 
K(E)} | [K(E) : k(z)]m~1. So if the divisor class corresponding to point P get killed 
by <f>* we should have: 
[deg(0)][P] = 0 => ord([P]) = s | deg(</>) | \K{E) : k{z)]m-1 => 
s | \K{E) : k(z)} 
However, in the case of cryptographic interest s is a very large prime (of 0(2160)) 
and to have a practical attack we want that the order of [K(E) : k{z)} be very small 
(~ 2). Therefore, it is impossible in practical situation that <f> does not transform the 
DLP to Cl°(K(C)) faithfully. 
3.6.3 Mapping Cl°(K(C)) t o Cl°(k(C0)) 
In this side of tower, as k(Co) C K(C), one may find it natural to use the Proposi-
tion 3.6.1 in the same way used in Section 3.6.2 and then use 0* to map the DLP. 
However, as the underlying function fields are defined over different constant field this 
time, the proposition is not applicable. Instead, we use simple Norm map of the field 
extention. 
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The norm map of extension K(C)/k(Co), Nx{c)jk(C0)^ induces a norm map from 
C/K to Co/k in following way 
n 
VP e C/K,NK{C)/k{Co)(P) = £ V ( P ) . (3-3) 
i = l 
Then one can naturally (additively) extend the norm function to the Div(K(C)). 
3.6.3.1 Preservation of the DLP under the norm map 
In the case of Norm function, it is proved in [Die03] that the kernel of Norm function 
does not have a subgroup of large prime order if there is no intermediary field L such 
that k C L C K. If there is such a intermediary field, we can replace n by n', a prime 
divisor of order n, in order to get rid of such an intermediary field and make sure that 
the DLP got preserved under this map. 

CHAPTER 4 
Even Characteristic Function Fields 
In this chapter we study the problem of attacking the DLP of elliptic curves defined 
over a field of even characteristic. This is a critical case because such elliptic curves are 
of special attention for cryptographers, due to the computational advantage. 
Therefore in this chapter we suppose that all fields have characteristic 2 and our 
prime base finite field is F2. Parallel to the notations we defined in section 3.3 we have 
k = ¥21- and K = F ^ ) " • E is an elliptic curve defined over the field K. 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, to attack a curve we need to accomplish 
the following two steps: 
1. Find a function field extension of K(E), namely K{C). 
2. Find an automorphism of K(C), namely a such that a\K = a^/k € G&l(K/k), 
and ord(<j) = n 
These two are not totally independent steps. We cannot expect that for a random 
general extension K(C), we succeed to find such an automorphism like a. However, with 
Hypothesis 3.3.3, that we assume in this thesis, we can guarantee that the Frobenius of 
K/k can be extended to such an automorphism. In [Hes04] the procedure of the GHS 
attack is studied in detail for a special set of rational subfields of K(E). We describe 
this work in this chapter. We also generalize some of the result to more general rational 
subfields of K(E). 
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We start this chapter with a concrete example of going through the algorithm. We 
then define the concept of minimal cr-polynomial and we study the if-module related 
to it. We discuss the implementation of the GHS attack by using quadratic extensions. 
This generalizes the case of Artin-Schreier extensions discussed in [GHS02b], [BSS05] 
and [Hes04]. In this chapter, we also discuss the result of [BSS05] for Artin-Schreier 
extensions. Finally, we discuss the security of a function field against the GHS attack 
and we define a field security index to assess it. 
4.1 Finding a suitable K{C) as an extension of K(E) 
To construct K(C), we find K(z) such that equation of E in terms of z has cr-polynomial 
with the smallest degree possible. We will define the concept of "cr-polynomial" in 




K := k{9) such that 0€k satisfies 97 + 9 + 1 = 0 
E/K :=y2 + xy + x3 + 0 
We choose here z = x. Now we want to extend the field extension K(E)/K(z) using 
the procedure described in last chapter. Let 
P(Y) := Y2 + zY + z3 + 9 € K(z)[Y] 
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Let 2/0 = V- Polynomial P(Y) is reducible over K(E) since yo is a root of P(Y). Let <x 
acts on on P{Y) by acting on its coefficients, Then 
P°(Y) = Y2 + zY + z3 + e2 
is irreducible over K{E). We can extend K(E) by adding a root of this polynomial, 
say yi, to get K\ := K{E)(y\). Continuing the procedure, we consider 
P°2(Y) = Y2 + zY2 + z3 + 64e K(z)[Y\. 
This polynomial is irreducible over K\ :— K(E)(yi). Let K2 := Ki(y2), where y2 is a 
root of PCT (F). Now we consider 
P°\Y) = Y2 + zY + z3 + 08 G A"(«)[y] 
which is irreducible over K2. Let ^ 3 = K2{y%) where 2/3 is a root of PCT (y) . 
We now consider 
Pa\Y) = Y2 + zY + z3 + 016 G K(z)[Y]. 
This polynomial is reducible over K3. Indeed, adding the three equations 
vl + zy0 + x3 + 6 = 0 
2/| + zy2 + x3 + 64 = 0 
yl + zj/3 + x3 + 08 = 0 
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and considering the fact that we work in characteristic 2, we get 
{y + Vi + yzf + x{y + y2 + y3) + x3 + (9s + 94 + 9) = 0. 
Since 
98 + e4 + e = e4 + e2 = (e2 + 9f = (98)2 = e16 mK = w2{9), 
we have 
(y + 2/2 + yzf + x{y + y2 + y3) + x3 + 9w = 0 
Then y+y2+yz is a root of Pa (Y), and Pa (Y) is reducible in K3 = K(z)(y0, yi,y2, yz)-
The good news is that no matter what power of o more than 4 we apply, we still get 
reducible polynomial. This will be proved in Theorem 4.3.1. 
The above example shows a desirable situation in which K(C) = K% is of degree 
23 = 8 over K(E) and not 26 = 32. In this way, C should have smaller genus and it 
should be easier to attack. 
Obviously one can choose another equation for E and one would not get a reducible 
polynomial before you extend the function field 7 times. In this regard, it is important 
to find z such that the defining polynomial of K(E)/K(z) becomes reducible after 
smaller number of application of a. In next section we will study the defining equation 
from this perspective. 
4.2 Minimal cr-polynomial 
To study the complexity of the attack, we need to formalize the example of the previous 
section. We stopped the process of extending the function field as soon as we had a 
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linear combination of conjugates of the curve's equation equal to zero. To formalize 
the procedure we define a Fa[£]—module over the additive group K+ of K, following 
[BSS05]. 
Proposi t ion 4.2.1 Let K+ be the additive group of K and let F2[t] act on K+ by 
e £ 
f(t) * b := J2 OiO-^b) forbeK and f(t) = ^ atf G ¥2[t}. 
i=0 i=0 
This makes K+ into an ¥2[t]-module. 
Proof. First we prove the distributivity. We have 
e 




= ^ O i a ^ b ^ + ^ a i c r ^ b s ) 
i=0 i=0 
= /(*) * b ! + f(t) * b2(fi(t) + h{t)) * (b) 
e 
= Y2(au + °2iK(b) 
=o 
t £ 
= ^ a H C T ^ + ^ T a ^ C b ) 
2=0 1=0 
= / i ( t ) * b + / 2 (« )*b 
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For the associativity, first we prove the result for monomials. Suppose / = X]i=oa^> 
then for a general monomial te we have: 
e e e 
te * (f(t) * b) = if * 5>a*"(b) = al'^aiai{h)) = 5>cr i+*'(b) = (^/(t)) * b 
i=0 i=0 i=0 
For the general case, we use induction over the degree of / . For degree 0 polynomials * 
is trivially associative. Suppose for all / ' such that deg(/') < £ and / ' = f'2f'\ we have 
for all b € K 
f(t)*b = f!i(t)*(fi(t)*b). 
Suppose that f(t) — f2(t)fi(t) such that deg(/) = £. We want to prove that f(t) *b = 
f2(t) * (h(t) * b). Suppose that deg(/2) = £' and f2(t) = te' + g{t) 
(f2)(fi)*b = (ti'+g(t))(f1)*b = ( / ) ( / i ) *b + g(t)(f2)*b. 
The first term of the right hand of the equality is equal to (tl * (fi) * b) as te is a 
monomial and we proved the associativity when one of the factors is monomial. And 
the second one is equal to g(t) * ((/i) * b) by induction as the degree g(t)(fi) is strictly 
less than deg(/). So we have 
( / 2 ) ( / i ) * b = / * ( ( / i ) * b ) + 5 ( * ) * ( ( / i ) * b ) 
= (lf+g(t))*((fi)*b) = (f2)*((f1)*b). 
• 
Definition 4.2.2 Let f(t) G ¥2{t]. We define a ¥2[t]-linear map, Lj^, on the module 
defined in Proposition 4-8.1 by 
Lf(t)(b):=f(t)*b 
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The kernel of £/(t) is a submodule of K+ denoted by Sf. 
It is straightforward that 
• K — S^+i-
. f{t) | g{t) =>SfC Sg. 
The other proprieties that we are interested in are as follows: 
Proposition 4.2.3 Suppose that f,g are two polynomials in ¥2[t] and [f,g] is their 
least common multiple. We have 
Sf®Sg = S[fjg] 
Proof. Let / ' , g' be such that, [/, g] = f'f — g'g for some polynomials / ' ,</ . 
(C) For all bj G S/ ,b 2 G Sg,[f,g] * (bi + b2) = [f,g] * (bi) + [f,g] * (b2) = 
f'f * bi + g'g * b 2 = / ' * ( / * bj) + g' * {g * b2) = 0 + 0 = 0 therefore, b2 + b 2 G S[Lg]. 
Q ) First we treat the case that (f,g) = 1 this means [f,g] = fg- Now for all 
b 6 Sfg we have g{t)f{i) * b = 0, by definition of Sjg and associativity of *, this means 
that f(t) * h G Sg. Similarly we have g(t) * b G 5 / . Now as (f,g) — 1, there exist 
polynomials hi,h\ such that fhi + g/i2 = 1. Additionally we have f(t) * b G Sg So 
(hif)*h = (/ i^^C/^b) € 5 5 as Sg is a F2-submodule. Similarly we have p/i2*b G 5 / . 
This two tells us that 
fhi*b + gh2*b = (fhi + gh2) * b 
= l*b = b<= Sf®Sg. 
Now suppose that h = (/,g), using Lemma 4.2.4, we can write h = h\h,2 such that 
(f/hi,g/h2) = 1 and [f,g] = [f/h1,g/h2] = (f'/h1)(g/h2). Using the co-prime case 
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we know that 5[y)fl] = Sf/hl © Sg/h2. But we know that Sf/hl C Sf and S//h2 C Sg, 
therefore, S ^ Q Sf ® Sg. 
D 
Lemma 4.2.4 Suppose that f,g are two elements of a unique factorization domain U, 
and h = gcd(f,g). We can always decompose h — hih.2 such that (f/hx,g/h2) = 1 and 
[f/hi,g/k2] = [f,g]. 
Proof. Suppose that / = p"1...p°n,g = pl{1...p^n be the prime decomposition of / ,g in 
£7. Then h = p™inlai,^1\..;?™inlQ!1'^1\ Now set /ii := 1, and follow following algorithm 
For 1 < i < n : if at < A such that tn := hi x p™in(Q''ft) 
Then we set /12 := h/h\. Now suppose that p\{f /h\,g/h,2) this means that there exists 
prime p\ such that Pi|(/, g). Now if a, < A =*• Pi t / / ^ l - Otherwise /% < c^ therefore 
pf* I /i2 so j>j \ g/1%2 which is a contradiction. 
• 
Proposition 4.2.5 For any b 6 K, there is a unique monic polynomial f(t) € ¥2[t] 
with minimal degree such that b e Sf. Furthermore, if g(t) * b = 0 £/jen /(£) divides 
9(t). 
Proof. Suppose i" = {g(t) € F2[i] such that g(t) * b = 0} the range of degree function 
on set I is well-ordered and we can choose f(t) as one of those who has minimum degree. 
Now suppose that g(t) * b = 0. By minimality of degree, we have, deg(g) > deg(/), 
dividing by f(t) we have g(t) = q(i)f{t) + r(t) such that deg(r(f)) < deg(/(i)) therefore 
0 = g{t) * b = q{t)f{t) * b + r(t) * b. But we know that f(t) * b = 0 so we must have 
r(t) * b = 0 which contradict the minimality condition of / . So f(t) is unique up to 
multiplication of a unit element. However being monic, make f(t) is unique. 
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D 
Based on Proposition 4.2.5, we define the concept of "minimal cr-polynomial". 
Definition 4.2.6 Minimal cr-polynomial For any element b € K+, the minimal cr-
polynomial ofb is the unique monic polynomial f(t) G F2[t] with minimal degree such 
that f(t) * b = 0. 
m 
We can extend the definition of operation * between f(t) — Y^ ait1 and a rational 
function g(z) 6 K(z) as follow 
m 
f(t)*g(z) = 52aig°i(z). 
Definition 4.2.7 For a rational function g(z) G K{z), the minimal a-polynomial of 
g{z) is monic polynomial rng(t) with minimal degree such that mg(t) * g(z) = 0. 
Knowing the minimal cr-polynomial of the coefficient of a polynomial g(z), Corol-
lary 4.2.8 to Proposition 4.2.3 helps us to find the the minimal cr-polynomial of g(z). 
e 
Corollary 4.2.8 Let g(z) — V^bj-z-7 6 K[z] be a polynomial. Then mg(t) = [m^ 
such that for 0 < j < £] and Smg = ® , = i Smb.. 
It is worthy of mention that unlike the case of minimal polynomial for an element 
of an algebraic extension, f(t) is not necessarily irreducible. For example consider 
k = F2 and K = F(0) where 02 + 9 + 1 = 0. We know that a2(9) = 6>4 = (0 + l )2 = 
92 + l = 9=$>6€ St2+1. It is clear that t2 + 1 is not irreducible over F2, however we 
claim it is the minimal cr-polynomial of 9. If not, then there exists a f{t) such that 
deg(f(t)) < 2 and f(t) * 9 = 0, however by uniqueness condition of Proposition 4.2.5, 
deg(/(i)) =^  2. The set of monic polynomials of degree 1 over K is {t, t + 1}. Similarly 
since a{d)2 = 92 = 9 + 1^9,9<£ St+i. Similarly 92 ^ 0 implies that 9 0 St. So, the 
a—minimal polynomial of 0 is the reducible polynomial t2 + 1. 
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4.3 General quadratic extensions 
Now that we have developed the theory of our submodules, we use it to study the 
complexity of the GHS attack for different curves. Suppose that E is defined by the 
equation 
PE • Y2h(z) + Yg{z) + f{z) = 0 such that f(z) G K{z),h(z),g(z) G k{z) (4.1) 
Then K{E) — K(z)(yo) where j/o is a root of (4.1). We do not confine ourself to 
represent the equation of the curve in Weierstrass form or any other special form, 
because we want to allow the attacker to use the form which gives the opportunity of 
reaching the "best" extension K{C) for attacking the original curve. The only constrains 
are: 
• we require that the equation of the curve is quadratic in Y. This allows us to use 
the linearity of square in characteristic 2 to implement a simpler attack. 
• We require that h(z),g(z) be in k(z). This also important for the algorithm of 
the attack. 
Also if in (4.1) the rational function, f(z) is defined as 
Hz) = ^~ 
such that q(z) $ k[z], we can replace it with 
NormK(:)/k{z)(g(z)) 
f(z) = qM _ . 
NormK(z)/k{z)(q(z)) 
So we can suppose that all rational functions in (4.1) have denominators in k[z]. 
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We also assume that (4.1) is not defined over any proper subfield of K(z), otherwise 
one can simply replace K(z) with that subfield. 
Let a be as defined in Chapter 3. Then 




If P | is irreducible over K(z, yo), we add its root y\ and we continue by acting on coef-
ficient of Pg. This leads to Algorithm 4.1 for finding K(C). This algorithm guarantees 
that [K(C) : K(z)] does not exceed 2m , where m is the degree of rrif(t) the minimal 
cr-polynomial of f(z) in( 4.1). 
Algorithm 4.1 FINDING K(C) USING GENERAL EXTENSION 
Require: K(E) an elliptic function field. 
K(z) a rational subfield of K(E) such that K(E) — K(z)(yo) is a quadratic exten-
sion of K(z). 
PE{Y) € /T(z)[Y] the minimal polynomial of yo over K(z), under form( 4.1). 
Ensure: Km = K{C) (as defined 3.3.3.1) such that [K{C) : K(z)] < 2m. 
1: Compute mf(t) £ F2[i] be the minimal cr-polynomial of f(z), where f(z) is given 
by ( 4.1). 
2: m <— deg(mj(t)) 
3: K0^-K(z)(y0) = K(E) 
4: for all i such that 1 < i < m do 
5: Pg-1 <~ Y2h(z) + y5(z) + ( / r " 1 (*) ^ 
6: Ki <— Ki-i(yi) where yj is a root of P | | 
7: end for 
8: return Km 
We now need to prove that using the above algorithm, we find the function field 
K(C) of the original GHS attack so it has same useful properties which allow us to 
descend it to k(CQ) and transfer the DLP to Cl°{k(C)). 
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Theorem 4.3.1 Validity of Algorithm 4.1 for general quadratic extensions If 
rrif is irreducible in K[t] then the outputs of Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 4-1 are equal. 
Proof. The Algorithm 4.1 is essentially a special case of Algorithm 3.1, beside the fact 
that it stops after m steps and unlike to algorithm 3.1, it does not loop for n steps. 
We argue that if Algorithm 4.1 does not stop (and continue as Algorithm 3.1 does) 
we would get exactly the same result. In the context of Algorithm 4.1, this means that 
the polynomials Pg € K(z)[Y] are reducible over ifm[y] for i = m,... , n. First we 
prove that if we apply a m times we get a reducible polynomial over Km. In the other 
words we want to show that 
a
m(Y2h(z) + Yg(z) + f(z)) = Y2h(z) + Yg(z) + am(f)(z) (4.2) 
is reducible over Km. 
According to the equation 4.1, my * h{z) = h(z),m,f * g(z) — g(z). Therefore after 
running the loop for m times (i = 0 . . .m — 1), we have following relationships which 
all defined over Km = K(z,y0,..., ym-i) 
ylh{z) + y0g(z) + f(z) = 0 
y\h{z) + yl9(z) + a{f){z) = 0 
y23h(z) + yig(z) + a2(f)(z) = 0 
y2m^h{z) + ym_! *g(z) + am~l{f){z) = 0. 
Now we know that my * / = 0. So we have 
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ao(yoh(z) + vog(z) + /(«)) + 
a^yjhiz) + yl9(z) + a(f)(z)) + 
a2{y22h{z) + yig(z) + a2(f)(z) + 
am^(y'm_1h(z)+ym-1g(z)+(rm-1(f)(z)) = 0 
Distributing a;'s we get 
m —1 m—\ m—\ 
i=0 i=0 i=0 
Using the fact that we are in characteristic 2 we can write the sum of squares of y[s as 
square of their sum. 
m— 1 m—1 m—1 
(J2 <HVi?Kz) + ( £ aivMz) + E ^'"(/X*) (4-3) 
i=0 i=0 i=0 
Let p(z) = X^7=o bj^J ' . as the denominator of q(z) G k[z] we deduce that m,f(t) = mp(t). 
By definition of m/, we know that for 




* £ ro-1 
j=0 j=0 1=0 
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Now because a is isomorphism we can write the last equality as follows 
TO—1 
p°m{z) = E a ^ ^ 
i=0 
Now dividing both side by q{z) considering the fact that qa{z) — q(z), we get 
m— 1 
/*"(*) = E^r1**) 
i=0 
Substituting this equality in 4.3 we get 
m— 1 m—1 
( E am)2^w + (E WW*) + r » = o 
i=0 i=0 
This means that J ^ L Q 1 aiVi 1S a r o o t f° r (Y^Hz) + V g ^ ) + f(z))am and therefore this 
equation is not irreducible. 
• 
4.4 Genus of K(C) 
The main appeal of Artin-Schreier and Kummer extensions considered in [Hes04] 
and [Die03], is that it is relatively easy to compute the genus of K{C) in these cases. 
However, there is no known method to compute the genus of K{C) in the general case 
of the GHS attack. 
In the case of quadratic extensions, however, we can compute an upper bound for 
the genus of K(C). 
Proposition 4.4.1 Let K{C) be the function field provided by Algorithm 4-1 and let 
gc be its genus. Then 
gc < m2m+1 + 1. 
4.4. Genus of K{C) 61 
Proof. For i € {0, . . . ,m}, let F* := K(z,yi) with t/j is defined in Algorithm 4.1. 
It is easy to see that for i € {l , . . . ,m}, Ki — K(yo,...,yi) is equal to /fi_iF,, the 
compositum of .£Q_i and F,. We want to find an upper bound for gi, the genus of K{. 
We can use Theorem III.10.3 of [Sti93], which bounds the genus of compositum of Ki-\ 
and Fi by their genera and the extension degree of K,. This gives 
9i < [Ki : #i_i]<fc_i + [Ki : Fi]gFi + ([Ki : K^] - l)([Ki : Fi] - 1). (4.4) 
The GHS construction is done by quadratic extensions so [Ki : jftTj-l] — 2. Also we 
know that Ki = Fi(yo,yi,..-,yi — 1) so [-FQ : Fj] = 2*. Moreover, Fi ~ K(E), a function 
field of genus 1. Substituting these in (4.4), we get the recursive bound 
gi < 2#_i + 2* + 2* - 1 = 2#_i + 2 m - 1. (4.5) 
Using induction, we climb the tower of paired function fields shown in Diagram 4.1 to 
get the explicit bound 
9i < i2i+1 + 1. 
For i = 1, the recursive bound and explicit bound are the same and show that g\ < 5. 
Now assuming the explicit bound for <ft_i and using the recursive bound for gi, we have: 
gi < 2^_ x + 2 i + 1 - l 
=>9i < 2 ( ( z - l ) 2 ( i - 1 ) + 1 - l ) ) + 2 m - l 
= (i - 1)2*+1 + 2 + 2 i + 1 - 1 
= i2i+1 + l. 
Using i = m we get the result. 
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• 
K0 = F0 
Diagram 4.1: The induction tower used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.1. 
4.5 Artin-Schreier extensions 
In the last section, we considered the GHS attack for an elliptic curve equation which 
is written in the form of (4.1). However, if we limit the type of the intermediate 
extension, i.e. K\/K(z),K2/K\,..., Km/Km-\, we can prove more precise results. The 
two special extensions which are studied in the GHS attack literature are the Artin-
Schreier extensions ([GHS02b], [Hes04]) and the Rummer extensions ([Die03], [The03]). 
If the elliptic curve is given by (4.1), the extension K(E)/K(z) and consequently 
Ki's are not Kummer extensions, since the degree of extension and the characteristic 
of the base field should be co-primes. 
Additionally, according to [The03] there is no non-supersingular elliptic curve over 
characteristic 2 whose function field is a Kummer extension over some rational subfield 
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K(z). 
However, the case of Artin-Schreier extensions for the GHS attack for even charac-
teristic function fields, is well studied and there is a rich literature on this subject for 
example [GHS02b], [Hes04], [BSS05]. We discuss the main features of this approach, 
mostly from [BSS05]. 
Definition 4.5.1 Artin-Schreier extensions for fields of even characteristics 
Suppose that F is a function field of characteristic 2, and g E F is an element such that 
for all h G F we have g ^ h2 — h, Therefore the polynomial 
Y2 - Y - u = 0 (4.6) 
does not have any root in F. Let F' = F(y), where y is a root of (4-6). Then F1 /F is 
called Artin-Schreier extension 
If we work in a characteristic p ^ 2 then the definition of Artin-Schreier extensions 
remains the same except that (4.6) would change to Yp — Y — u = 0. These extensions 
have many nice properties. For example, an Artin-Schreier extension is always Galois. 
To see that, suppose y is a root of 4.6. Then we have 
(y + If - (y + 1) - u = yp + lp - y - 1 - u = y? - y - u = 0, 
and y + 1 is a root of that equation as well. Inductively y + i such that 0 < i < p 
are roots of this equation. Therefore by adding one root of this equation, it happens 
that all other roots also belong to the same extension, which means the extension is the 
splitting field of the equation with p different roots, and is Galois consequently. 
Although any separable quadratic extension is Galois, the fact that the 2 roots are 
y and y + 1 is special to Artin-Schreier extensions, and will be important for us. In 
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characteristic 2 we can change also the general form of Artin-Schreier equation to 
Y2 + Y + u = 0 (4.7) 
4.5.1 Elliptic curve equation in Artin-Schreier form 
We want to show that all elliptic curves can be described by an Artin-Schreier equation 
by means of a simple change of variables. Proposition A.1.1 [Sil94] says that any elliptic 
curve over a field characteristic two can be defined using either of the following equations 
depending on the value of j(E) 
• Y2 + a3Y = x3 + aAx + a6 if j(E) = 0 
• Y2 + xY = x3 + a2x2 + a6 if j(E) ^ 0 
For the case that j(E) = 0 we have 
Y2 + a3Y = x3 + a4x + a6. (4.8) 
One can replace Y' = Y/a^ =» Y = a^Y' and the result would be 
a\Y'2 + a2Y' = x3 + a4x + a6 
Dividing both side by a\ we get 
Y'2 + Y' + g{x) = 0 where g(x) := {x3 + a4x + a6)/a3, (4.9) 
which is in the Artin-Schreier form. 
On the other hand, if j(E) ^ 0, we can describe E with following equation 
Y2 + xY = x3 + a2x2 + a6 such that j(E) = l /a6 . (4.10) 
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In this case, as it is done in [BSS05], we can write Y = ^Y'/z + a§ ,x = 7/2. We 
get 
2y,2 y , 2
 af 2 
zz z* z z* 
2 
Cancelling ag from both side and multiplying both side by % we get 
y'2
 + Y' + 4 /2/7 = 7 / z + a2, 
and rearranging the terms we get 
y/2
 + y/ + j ^ = Q g u c h t h a t j - ^ . = 7 + flV2^ + ^ ^ 4 > n j 
which is also an Artin-Schreier equation. 
Elliptic curves with zero j-invariant are not considered secure in cryptogra-
phy [HMV03] and for that reason we do not consider that case in following process. 
4.5.2 The GHS attack with Artin-Schreier extensions 
To implement the GHS attack with Artin-Schreier extension we use the Algorithm 4.1, 
however assume that E is given by an equation of type 4.11. This means that we make 
a set of Artin-Schreier equations 
Y2 + Y + f(z) = 0 
Y2 + Y + f"(z) = 0 
Y2 + Y + r2(f)(z) = 0 
Y2 + Y + rm~\z) = 0, 
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and we want to extend K(E) to a field Km = K{C), such that all these equations has a 
roots. Using the result of Theorem 4.3.1, we know that the remaining n — m equations 
y2 + y + /ffm(z) = o 
Y2 + Y + rm+1(z) = 0 
Y2 + Y + rn~1(z) = 0 
also have roots in Km. Moreover, for any d e K(z) we know that the equation Y2 + 
Y + d2 + d has a solution d. 
Finally, it is easy to see that if Km contains roots of different Artin-Schreier equa-
tions such as y\ + y\ + a = 0 and y% + y2 + b = 0 then 
(yi + yif + (yi + 2/2) + a + b = 0 
therefore it also has roots of Y2 + Y + a + b — 0. Therefore, independently of how we 
define and construct Km, we can redefine it as follow: Let A be the F^i]—submodule 
generated by all elements d2 + d for any d £ K(z) and f(z). Then Km is the smallest 
field such that for any b e A , Y2 + Y + h = 0, has a root in Km. 
The fact that A is defined an F2[i]-submodule means that A is closed under operator 
*, therefore Y2 + Y + ax(f)(z) has solution in Km for any i. This shows that the field 
Km generated by above procedure contains the K(C) needed for the GHS attack. 
The following theorem from [BSS05] and [Hes04], describes completely the situation 
when the extension Km/K(z) is formed by Artin-Schreier intermediate extensions. 
Theorem 4.5.2 The GHS attack for Artin-Schreier extensions Suppose E is an 
elliptic curve defined using Equation ^.11. Let (3 := y/a^/q. Let m7 , mp and mf(z) be 
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the minimal a-polynomials 0/7 and (3 and f(z) respectively. Let Co be the curve defined 
over k (as defined in Section 3.3.1), such that K{CQ) = K(C) = Km, Then we have 
• if there exists d 6 K such that 0,2 — d2 + d, then ra/(2) — [m7, mp]; otherwise 
m
m = K , mp,t + i\. 
• the genus of Co is equal to 
2deg([m7,ro /3]) _ 2deg( [m 7 ,m 0 ] ) -deg(m 7 ) _ 2deg([ro7 ,m / S])-deg(m / 3) _^_ -^ 
• if 7 € k or j3 € k then Co is hyperelliptic. 
4.6 Security evaluation of composite fields 
We now want to investigate how secure is a specific even characteristic field with com-
posite degree against the GHS attack. The security of these fields is studied in [JMS01], 
[BSS05], [SmaOl], [MTW04], [MMT01], and [MT06] [MQ01] for the GHS attack using 
Artin-Schreier extensions. However, here we consider that our curve is defined in the 
more general form of (4.1) and we do not confine our study to curves with Artin-Schreier 
equation. 
According to Theorem 4.3.1, the final factor that defines the efficiency of attack is 
the degree of my in Algorithm 4.1. 
4.6.1 Security of coefficients of f(z) 
we know that mf(t) is the minimal degree among the polynomials which annihilate all 
coefficients of numerator of f(z). 
The Corollary 4.2.8, means that a curve with low security (by low security, we mean 
small m) is a curve which is expressible as (4.1) such that 
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• All coefficients of f(z) have minimal <7-polynomial of low degree. 
• The least common multiplier of those polynomials have small degree. 
In following sections we focus on the first condition. The second condition, however, is 
more complicated and need more research. 
4.6.2 On polynomial tn + 1 
Clearly, for all b G K we have an(b) + b = 0, so b e St^+i and by Proposition 4.2.5, 
nib | tn + 1. Therefore the factorization of tn 4- 1 is related to the size of ro = deg(m/). 
Lemma 4.6.1 (Lemma 2, [MQ01]) Let n be an odd prime. Let d = ordn(2) be the 
order of2 € Z/nZ. Write n = ds + 1. Then tn + 1 = fo{t)h{t) • • • fs(t) over ¥2[t}. 
where 
• For 1 < i < s,fi(t) is irreducible over¥2-
• For 1 < i < s.deg(fi) = d. 
• For iy£ j we have (ft, fj) = 1. 
To categorize the elements of K according to their security level toward the GHS 
attack, we associate following set to each element. 
Definition 4.6.2 Suppose n is prime, and the fi's are as defined in Lemma 4-6.1. We 
define set If, for any element b £ K by 
/ b = {^  such that fi(t) divides mb(t)} 
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Fixing an odd prime n, the number of elements of i& is a measure of the degree of 
mi)(t) which is related to m = deg(m/(£)). As an attacker, we want m to be small. We 
now compare the various elements b of a given field K from that point of view. The least 
secure elements among the elements of K, are those with 1^ = 1. Another interesting 
questions, is to consider a specific subset S C {0 , . . . , s}, and ask what are the elements 
b such that Ij, = S. To answer these questions we need to study the submodules of the 
F2-module defined in Section 4.2. 
4.6.3 The structure of K+ as a F2-module 
As it is mentioned in Section 4.6.2, when n is an odd prime, for any f(t) G F2[i], Sj has 
one of 2S + 1 submodules. Therefore we want to study these submodules to understand 
the security of different elements of the field against the GHS attack. 
The following lemma allows us to generalize idea of I\, to submodules of K+. 
Lemma 4.6.3 Let S be an ¥2[t]—submodule of K+. Suppose that S can be generated by 
bi , . . . ,b^ . Then for any b € S, we have deg(m;>(£)) < deg([mbi, • • • ,rribe])- Moreover, 
Proof, bj 6 S'TOb. and as it is a submodule therefore < bj >C Smb. therefore < 
e
 z 
b i , . . . , b „ >C ( | ) S m b . by proposition 4.2.3 we have < b i , . . . , b n >C S[m b i v . . ) m b j 
but b G< b i , . . . , b „ > therefore mi, | [mb,,...,mbB]. Now the statement about if, is 
clear by definition. 
• 
Definition 4.6.4 Let S be a ¥2$]—submodule of K+ generated byb\,...,be we define 
LS := UU/fc-
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If there is another generating set for S, we can conclude with double inclusion that 
the 7g for the new generating set would be the same which assures that Definition 4.6.4, 
is well-defined. 
The submodules which have \I§\ = 1 are the most interesting submodules for us as 
they contain the least secure elements of the field. To implement an algorithm to find 
these submodules, we use linear algebra to analyze the Probenius automorphism which 
is a linear operator over K as a k vector space. Let A be the matrix representing this 
Frobenius operator. By the Normal Basis Theorem [Mor96], the minimal polynomial 
oiAistn + l. 
A l g o r i t h m 4 . 2 FINDING THE GENERATORS OF WEAKEST SUBMODULES 
1: Compute the matrix A, the matrix of Frobenius automorphism as a linear operator 
of K/k. 
2: Factorize tn + l = (t+ l)/i(«) • • • f3(t) 
3: for all i E. { 1 , . . . ,s} do 
4: Compute fi(A). 
5: Use Gaussian Elimination to compute a basis for the kernel of fi(A). 
6: Print out the basis elements, which are generators of the unsecure submodule. 
7: end for 
Although the basis elements contains a basis for a subspace of K, we know that the 
submodule generated by these elements also has \Is\ = 1 and is annihilated by fi(t). 
Therefore the algorithm print out generator of submodules which contains elements of 
m = i. 
We implemented this algorithm and applied it to different fields. Those results are 
presented in 5.3. 
4.6.4 Field security evaluator 
The method presented above can determine if the defining equation of an elliptic curve 
is weak against the GHS attack of the DLP. However, this method cannot assure us of 
the security of the curve, because one can presumably write another equation for the 
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curve with coefficients which are weak against the GHS. How can we then make sure 
that a chosen elliptic curve is secure? 
A partial answer to above question could be as follow: if the curve is defined over a 
field in which all the elements are secure, then no matter how we change our equation 
we get a secure equation again. In language of the GHS attack, this means that all 
element of the field should have a minimal cr-polynomial of high degree. The weakest 
elements of the field are those whose minimal cr-polynomial is of degree d as defined 
in Lemma 4.6.1. Therefore we can evaluate the security of a field against the GHS by 
considering the parameter d of that field. When d — n — 1, we have highest expected 
security. If we systematically choose n an odd prime such that ord„(2) = n — 1, then 
mb{t)\(t + l ) / i ( i ) for all beK. Since mh(t) + 1 if b ^ 0 and mb(t) ^{t + l)ifbgk, 
this mean fi(t) | m^t) for all b. Therefore the deg(m/) as defined in Algorithm 4.1, 
is either n or n — 1. Presumably the genus of K{C) would be high in that case. This 
mean that for a reasonably large n, the GHS attack does not work for the curve. 
According to Lemma 4.6.1, we get a fields with d = n — 1 whenever 2 has order 
n — 1 in (Z/nZ)* for a prime n. The question of identifying the odd primes n such that 
2 has order n — 1 is a well-known question in number theory, called the Artin primitive 
root conjecture. Let a e Z be square free and not ±1 . Artin conjectured that there are 
infinity many primes n such that the order of a is n — 1. 
Let Na(x) = # { n < x : a has order n - 1 in (Z/nZ)*}. It is proved in [Hoo67] that 
under General Riemann Hypothesis we have 
Na(x) - C(a)n(x), 
in which C(a) is a positive constant and 7r(x) is the number of primes up to x. Uncon-
ditional results were first obtained in [GM84], and improved afterwards. To this day, 
we know that there are at most 2 odd primes for which Artin conjecture fails [HB86]. 
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We have done the numerical analysis for all extension of F2 whose degree is a prime 
less than 512 and we represent it in Section 5.3.4. 
CHAPTER 5 
Implementation and Computational 
Result 
In this section we discuss implementation of the attack and the field evaluator. First 
we see the implementation the "Evaluator" and we bring the result of execution of the 
implementation for n 6 [3..512] : n is prime. This range of n is of cryptographic interest. 
After that we will see the implementation of the general attack. Then we run our 
attack on some simple example and we see the property of resulting curve C and its 
function field extension K{C). 
5.1 Choosing the computer algebra system 
We considered "Sage", "Kash" and "Magma" computer algebra systems for our imple-
mentations. 
Sage is free software licensed under GNU General License [Fre07] and therefore open 
source. For that reason many mathematicians, and more specifically number theorist 
contributed to its development in recent years. We implement our primarily implemen-
tation of the attack in Sage. However, Sage has a serious limitation in multiple extension 
of function field which made the implementation of the complete attack impossible. 
Kash is a computer algebra system which is free (but not a free software) and so it is 
not an open source software. GHS attack as it is described in [GHS02b] was originally 
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implemented in Kash. Therefore it was natural that we considered Kash as our second 
option. However, Magma, the third candidate of Computer Algebra System, contains 
Kash completely and one can run any capability of Kash in Magma. Magma is not free 
software nor free. 
All the implementation is done in Magma which is the most comprehensive computer 
algebra language for making computation in algebraic function fields and working with 
curves, As it is described above. 
5.2 Security evaluator 
Using algorithm 4.2 we can find the unsecure subspaces of K/k. In this sense we can 
rank finite fields according to their security against GHS attack. This also helps us to 
find the unsecure subspaces which means if the coefficient of f(z) in Equation 4.1 are 
all in one of these subspace, we would finish with a unsecure elliptic curve. 
We also use the result of this attack to construct a low security curves to be attacked 
in Section 5.5. 
5.2.1 Implementat ion of the security evaluator 
Listing 5.1: 'Magma implementation for finding the generators of the least secure mod-
ules' 
1 /******** WeakElementFinder .m ********* 
2 * This program is intended to find the elements in a f in i t e f ie lds 
3 * for if they are used as coef f ic ien ts of an e l l i p t i c curve 
4 * defining polynomial the GHS at tack with r e l a t i ve ly low genus 
5 * would be possible to the curve. 
6 * 
7 * The algorithm isfor finding unsecure elements in the field . The 
8 * t r ick is to look at Frobenius as a l inear operator and find the 
9 * kernel of i r r educ ib l e factors of t"n + 1. 
10 */ 
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11 
12 /********Bas ic D e f i n i t i o n s and I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ********/ 
13 c l e a r ; 
14 
15 / * As def ined in T h e s i s : example r*n = 155 => r = 15 n = 3 1 * / 
16 p := 2; 
17 r := 1; 
18 n := 3 1 ; 
19 
20 k := F i n i t e F i e l d ( p , r ) ; 
21 
22 IP<Theta> := I r r e d u c i b l e P o l y n o m i a l ( k, n ) ; 
23 kT<T> := P a r e n t ( I P ) ; 
24 
25 p r i n t "Bas ic P a r a m e t e r s : p = " , p , " , r = " , r , " , n = " , n ; 
26 p r i n t "Ex tend ing po lynomia l I P : " , I P ; 
27 
28 K<t> := ext<k | I P > ; 
29 
30 /**** Computing F roben ius Matr ix ****/ 
31 A := T r a n s p o s e ( M a t r i x ( k , n , n , / 
32 [E ]emen tToSequence ( ( t~ i ) ~ ( 2 ) ) : i in [ 0 . . n - l ] ] ) ) ; 
33 p r i n t " F r o b e n i u s M a t r i x : " ,A; 
34 
35 / * F a c t o r i n g the F roben iu s Minimal P o l y n o m i a l * / 
36 if ( I s P r i m e ( n ) ) then 
37 ZnZ := F i n i t e F i e l d ( n ) ; 
38 p r i n t " M u l t i p l i c a t i v e o rde r of 2 in Z/nZ i s : " , Order (2*ZnZ. 1 ) ; 
39 end if ; 
40 
41 FroMini := T~n + 1; 
42 F roMin iFac t s := F a c t o r i z a t i o n ( F r o M i n i ) ; 
43 
44 p r i n t " F a c t o r i z a t i o n of", F roMin i , " : " ; 
45 p r i n t F r o M i n i F a c t s ; 
46 
47 for CurFact in F roMin iFac t s do 
48 p r i n t "Cur r en t F a c t o r : " , CurFact [ 1 ] ; 
49 CurMat := E v a l u a t e (CurFac t [1] , A ) ; 
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50 CurKer := Nullspace (CurMat); 
51 
52 print CurKer; 
53 
54 end for ; 
5.3 Computational result of field evaluator 
To work with a computational sample data. We worked with K G {F25,F27,F23i}. It is 
worthy of mention that no matter what r is in k = ¥pr the security level of K = F(pr)n 
just depends on n. This is because we look at decomposition of tn + l over F2. Therefore 
in the following we assume that we treat the simplest case which is r = 1: 
5.3.1 Case n — 5 
In the case n = 5, as you can see we get min(ra) = d = ords(2) = 4 which make the 
extension degree \K{C) : K] = 24 which means that the field is secure: 
Basic Parameters: p = 2 , r = l , n = 5 
Extending polynomial IP: T~5 + T~2 + 1 
Frobenius Matrix: 
[ 1 0 0 0 1] 
[ 0 0 0 1 0 ] 
[ 0 1 0 0 1 ] 
[ 0 0 0 1 1 ] 
[ 0 0 1 0 0 ] 
Factorization of T"5 + 1: 
[ 
<T + 1, 1>, 
<T~4 + T~3 + T~2 + T + 1, 1> 
] 
Current Factor: T + 1 
Vector space of degree 5, dimension 1 over GF(2) 
Echelon basis: 
(10 0 10) 
Current Factor: T~4 + T~3 + T~2 + T + 1 
Vector space of degree 5, dimension 4 over GF(2) 
Echelonized basis: 
( 0 1 0 0 0 ) 
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( 0 0 1 0 0 ) 
( 0 0 0 1 0 ) 
( 0 0 0 0 1 ) 
5.3.2 Case n = 7 
In this case we get min(m) = d = ord7(2) = 3 with subspace of dimension 3. This 
means that if it happens that the coefficients of f(x) in Equation 4.1 are in one of these 
two subspace, the extension degree of \K(C) : K] = 23 instead of expected 26, which 
much less secure. 
B a s i c P a r a m e t e r s : p = 2 , r = 1, n = 7 
Extend ing po lynomia l I P : T~7 + T + 1 
F roben ius M a t r i x : 
[ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
[ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ] 
[ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 ] 
[ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ] 
[ 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 ] 
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ] 
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 ] 
M u l t i p l i c a t i v e o r d e r of 2 i n Z/nZ i s : 3 
F a c t o r i z a t i o n of T~7 + 1: 
[ 
<T + 1, 1>, 
<T~3 + T + 1, 1>, 
<T~3 + T~2 + 1, 1> 
] 
Cur r en t F a c t o r : T + 1 
Vector space of d e g r e e 7 , d imension 1 over GF(2) 
Eche lon ized b a s i s : 
( 1 0 0 0 0 0 0) 
Current Factor: T~3 + T + 1 
Vector space of degree 7, dimension 3 over GF(2) 
Echelonized basis: 
( 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ) 
( 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 ) 
( 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ) 
Current Factor: T~3 + T~2 + 1 
Vector space of degree 7, dimension 3 over GF(2) 
Echelonized basis: 
( 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ) 
( 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ) 
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( 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ) 
5.3.3 Case n = 31 
This case is the most interesting case among our example, one may expect that size of 
\K(C) : K(z)} = 231 usually, however, we have six, 5-dimensional unsecure subspaces. 
Even if it happens that the coefficient of f(z) are in two different subspaces still we can 
attack using \K{C) : K] = 210 which is significantly less than 230. 
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0 0 0] 
0 0 1] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 1] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
1 0 0] 
0 0 0] 
0 1 0 ] 
1 0 0] 
0 0 1] 
0 1 0 ] 
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1, 1>, 
+ T~2 + 1, 1>, 
+ T~3 + 1, 1>, 
+ T"3 + T~2 + T + 
+ T~4 + T~2 + T + 
+ x~4 + T~3 + T + 




+ 1, 1> 
M u l t i p l i c a t i v e o r d e r of 2 in Z/nZ i s : 5 










Cur r en t F a c t o r : T + 1 
Vec tor space of d e g r e e 3 1 , d imens ion 1 over GF(2) 
Eche lon ized b a s i s : 
( 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0) 
Cur r en t F a c t o r : T~5 + T"2 + 1 
Vec tor space of d e g r e e 3 1 , d imens ion 5 over GF(2) 
Eche lon ized b a s i s : 
(0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0) 
(0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 ) 
(0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ) 
(0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1) 
Cur r en t F a c t o r : T~5 + T~3 + 1 
Vec tor space of d e g r e e 3 1 , d imens ion 5 over GF(2) 
Eche lon i zed b a s i s : 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1) 
C u r r e n t F a c t o r : T~5 + T~3 + T~2 + T + 1 
Vector space of d e g r e e 3 1 , d imension 5 over GF(2) 
Eche lon ized b a s i s : 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
C u r r e n t F a c t o r : T~5 + T~4 + T~2 + T + 1 
Vector space of d e g r e e 3 1 , d imension 5 over GF(2) 
Eche lon i zed b a s i s : 
(0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
(0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Current Factor: T~5 + T~4 + T~3 + T + 1 
Vector space of degree 31, dimension 5 over GF(2) 
Echelonized basis: 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 ) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 ) 
Current Factor: T~5 + T~4 + T~3 + T~2 + 1 
Vector space of degree 31, dimension 5 over GF(2) 
Echelonized basis: 
(0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0) 
(0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 ) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1) 
(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 ) 
5.3.4 Field security table 
In this section we check all primes in [3, ...,512] against applicability of GHS attack. 
The chosen interval is particularly of cryptographic interest. In Table 5.1 one can see 
the minimum m that a curve can have on the specified field: 
5.4 The GHS attack for general function field extensions 
Using Algorithm 4.1 we can find K(C) efficiently. However, this algorithm needs to 
know exact degree of mj as it is defined in Section 4.3. We can run Algorithm 4.2 
for each coefficients of f(z) and then uses Theorem 4.2.3 to find exact degree of m. 
Therefore in this implementation we suppose that m is given: 
5.4.1 Implementation of the attack 
Listing 5.2: 'Magma implementation for the function field K(CY 
1 //FCompositonKash .m 
2 
3 / / I n i t i a l i z i n g the program 
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Table 5.1: The security of weakest elements of extensions of F2 with prime degree 
< 1000. The smallest field extension can be achieved using Algorithm 4.1 is of degree 
2d over K(z). The fields which admit non-trivial factorization of tn + 1 are noted by * 
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4 c l e a r ; 
5 / / To whether check if t h e r e s u l t i n g curve is h y p e r e l l i p t i c or not 
6 H y p e r e l l i p t i c C h e c k := t r u e ; 
7 
8 / / D e f i n i n g the f i e l d s 
9 p — 2; 
10 r — 1; 
11 n := 3; 
12 
13 m_fDegree := 2; 
14 
15 / / C o n s t r u c t i n g the F i e l d s and the Homomorphisms between them 
16 k := F i n i t e F i e l d ( p , r ) ; 
17 kx<x> := R a t i o n a l F u n c t i o n F i e l d (k ) ; 
18 kxT<T> := P o l y n o m i a l R i n g ( k x ) ; 
19 
20 IP<Theta> := I r r e d u c i b l e P o l y n o m i a l ( k , n ) ; 
21 kT<Theta> := P a r e n t ( I P ) ; 
22 p r i n t "Bas ic P a r a m e t e r s : p = " , p , " , r = " , r , " , n = " , n ; 
23 
24 EmbkTkxT := hom< kT-> kxT | T>; 
25 TIP := EmbkTkxT(IP); 
26 
27 p r i n t "Ex tend ing K/k w i t h " , T IP ; 
28 K<t> := ext<k | I P > ; 
29 Kx<x> :- R a t i o n a l F u n c t i o n F i e l d (K); 
30 
31 kxbyb<y> := P o l y n o m i a l R i n g ( k x ) ; 
32 KxbYb<Y> := Polynomia lRing (Kx); 
33 
34 kxy<yp,xp> :— P o l y n o m i a l R i n g ( k , 2 ) ; 
35 KbXYb<YP,XP> : = P o l y n o m i a l R i n g ( K , 2 ) ; 
36 
37 / / D e f i n i n g the curve 
38 / / N o i r r e d u c i b i l i t y check! 
39 
40 At t ackedCurves := {Y~2 + x*Y + t*x~3 + t / * , Y ~ 2 + Y + 1/x + t * x , 
41 Y"2 + x*Y + x ' 3 + 1 * / } ; 
42 
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43 for E in At tackedCurves do 
44 p r i n t "" ; 
45 p r i n t "********"; 
46 
47 p r i n t "The O r i g i n a l Curve under a t t a c k , E i s : " ; 
48 p r i n t E; 
49 
50 mCounter := 0; //How many t imes we extend our b a s i c c u r v e ' s f . f . 
51 
52 ExtendingCurve := E; 
53 FR := [KxbYb]; 
54 F := [ F u n c t i o n F i e l d (Ex tend ingCurve : Check := f a l s e ) ] ; 
55 
56 / / E x t e n d i n g F roben ius 
57 sigmaK := hom<K->F[ l ] | t ' ( p ' r ) > ; 
58 sigmaT :— hom<Kx->F [ 1 ] | sigmaK , Kx. 1 >; 
59 sigmaE := [*hom<F[l] ->F[ 1] | s igmaT, F [ l ] . l > * ] ; 
60 
61 for nCounter in [ l . . n —1] do 
62 
63 CurRing<YP> : = PoIynomia lRing(F[mCounter + l ] : Global := f a l s e ) ; 
64 Append(~FR, CurRing) ; 
65 
66 AssignNames(~FR[nCounter + 1] , [ n w " * I n t e g e r T o S t r i n g (nCounte r ) ] ) ; 
67 
68 sigmaEP := hom<FR[nCounte r+ l ] ->FR[nCounte r+ 1] | sigmaE [mCounter+ 1], 
69 FR[nCounter + l ] . l > ; 
70 ExtendingCurve := sigmaEP (Ex tend ingCurve ) ; 
71 
72 p r i n t "Applying s i g m a ' " , nCoun te r , " r e s u l t s in e q u a t i o n "; 
73 p r i n t Ex tend ingCurve ; 
74 
75 mCounter := mCounter + 1; 
76 Append(~F, F u n c t i o n F i e l d (Ex tend ingCurve : Check := f a l s e ) ) ; 
77 
78 / / E x t e n d i n g F roben ius 
79 CurK := hom<K->F[mCounter + l ] | s i g m a K ( t ) > ; 
80 CurT := hom<Kx->F[mCounter+ 1] | CurK, K x . l > ; 
81 for i in [ 1 . . mCounter] do 
84 Chapter 5. Computational result 
82 CurT := hom<F[ i ] ->F[mCounte r + l ] |CurT , F [ i ] . l > ; 
83 end for ; 
84 Append(~sigmaE , hom<F[mCounter+l]—>F[mCounter + l ] | CurT, 
85 F[mCounter + l ] . l > ) ; 
86 
87 if (mCounter eq m_fDegree — 1) then 
88 b r e a k ; 
89 end i f ; 
90 
91 end for ; 
92 
93 p r i n t "Compositon degree [K(C):K(E)J = 2 ~ " , mCounter; 
94 
95 KC := A b s o l u t e F u n c t i o n F i e l d ( F [ m C o u n t e r + l ] ) ; 
96 PC<yp,xp> := Def in ingPo lynomia l (KC) ; 
97 
98 p r i n t "The genus of the func t i on f i e l d K(C) i s : " , Genus(KC); 
99 
100 / /Map PC to a u n i v a r i a t e - l o o k i n g Ring! 
101 CanKbXYbKxbYb := hom<KbXYb - > KxbYb | Y, x > ; 
102 C := CanKbXYbKxbYb (PC); 
103 p r i n t "C i s " , C; 
104 
105 / / R e d e f i n i n g KC d i r e c t l y with t he d e f i n i n g e q u a t i o n : j u s t for 
106 / / e f f i c i e n c y . 
107 KGcY> := F u n c t i o n F i e l d ( C : Check := f a l s e ) ; 
108 KCbWrxtt£> : = PolynomialRing (KC); 
109 
110 FroKKxbYb : = hom<K->FR[ 1 ] | s i g m a K ( t ) > ; 
111 FroKxKxbYb : = hom<Kx->FR[ 1 ] | FroKKxbYb, K x . l > ; 
112 FroKxbYbKxbYb := hom<FR[l]->FR[ 1] | FroKxKxbYb, F R [ 1 ] . 1 > ; 
113 
114 ImgC := FR[1] ! C; 
115 ProdC := C; 
116 for i in [ l . . n —1] do 
117 ImgC — FroKxbYbKxbYb (ImgC); 
118 ProdC *:= ImgC; 
119 
120 end for ; 
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121 
122 p r i n t "Prod_{i = l . . n}S igma(C(Y) ) = "; 
123 p r i n t ProdC; 
124 
125 p r i n t "Complete F a c t o r i z a t i o n of above Produc t over KC[W]: " ; 
126 p r i n t F a c t o r i z a t i o n (KCbWb ! P rodC) ; 
127 
128 if ( H y p e r e l l i p t i c C h e c k ) then 
129 P2<Z,Y,x> := P r o j e c t i v e S p a c e ( K , 2 ) ; 
130 
131 AI := i dea l <KbXYb| [PC] >; 
132 KXYZcZ,Y,x>, hm :- Homogenizat ion ( A I ) ; 
133 PPC := Bas i sE lement (hm(AI) , 1 ) ; 
134 
135 C := Curve(P2 ,PPC) ; 
136 h p i c i t y , HC,hmp := I s H y p e r e l l i p t i c 
137 if ( h p i c i t y ) then 
138 p r i n t "C is h y p e r e l l i p t i c . C is 
139 
140 e l s e 
141 p r i n t "C is NOT h y p e r e l l i p t i c . " ; 
142 
143 end if; 
144 
145 end if; 
146 
147 end for ; 
5.5 Computational result of running the attack 
In this section investigate some individual examples of curves over different field. For 
this reason we chose n 6 3, 7 ,31. 
(C) ; 
" , HC; 
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5.5.1 Case n = 3 
In this section we attack the curve Y2 + xY — x3 + tx2 + 1 such that k = ¥2 is extended 
to K(t) such that t3 + t + 1. The minimal polynomial of Frobenius is factorized as 
tz + 1 = (f + l)(t2 + t + l). Now f(x) = X 3 + to2 + 1. So we have mx = < + 1 and 
mt(t) =t2 + t + l. This mean m} = [t + 1, t2 +1 + 1} = i3 + 1. Therefore deg(m/) = 3. 
By running the attack we get following result: 
Basic Parameters: p = 2 , r = l , n = 3 
Extending K/k with T~3 + T + 1 
The Original Curve under attack E is: 
Y~2 + x*Y + x~3 + t 
Applying sigma" 1 results in equation 
wl~2 + x*wl + x~3 + t~2 
Applying sigma~ 2 results in equation 
w2~2 + x*w2 + x~3 + t~4 
Compositon degree [K(C):K(E)] = 2" 2 
The genus of the function field K(C) is: 3 
C is Y~8 + (t~2*x~7 + t~4*x~6 + t~6*x~5 + t*x~4)*Y~4 + (t~3*x~7 + 
t~5*x~6)*Y~2 + (x~14 + t~2*x~13 + t~4*x~12 + t~6*x"ll + t*x~10 + 
t~3*x~9 + t~5*x~8)*Y + t~3*x~20 + t~3*x~18 + t*x~17 + t~6*x~16 + 
t*x~15 + t~5*x~14 + t~4*x~13 + x~12 + t~2*x~ll + t~3*x~10 + t~3*x~9 
+ x~8 + t~2*x~7 + t~6*x~6 + t*x~5 + t~4*x~4 + t~4 
Prod_-Ci = i..n}Sigma(C(Y)) = 
Y~24 + x~5*Y~20 + (x~7 + x-~6)*Y~18 + (x~14 + x~ll + x~9 + x"8)*Y~17 
+ (x~20 + x~18 + x~16 + x~13 + x~6)*Y~16 + (x~14 + x~12 + x~ll + 
x~10)*Y~14 + (x~16 + x"14 + x~13 + x~12)*Y~13 + (x~27 + x~26 + x~22 
+ x~21 + x~20 + x~18 + x~15 + x~13 + x~12 + x~ll + x~9 + x~8 + 
x~7 + x~5 + x~4)*Y"12 + (x~20 + x~18 + x~17 + x~16)*Y~ll + (x~28 + 
x~25 + x~22 + x~21 + x~20 + x~17 + x~15 + x~14 + x~12 + x~7)*Y~10 
+ (x~33 + x~32 + x~28 + x~26 + x~24 + x~23 + x~20 + x"*18 + x~16 + 
x~15 + x~13 + x~ll + x"10 + x~9)*Y~9 + (x~36 + x~34 + x~33 + x~32 
+ x~31 + x"28 + x~27 + x~26 + x~23 + x~22 + x~17 + x~16 + x~15 + 
x-13 + x-11 + x~9 + x~7 + x~6 + x"5 + 1)*Y~8 + (x~28 + x~26 + x~25 
+ x~24)*Y~7 + (x~32 + x~31 + x~30 + x~28 + x~26 + x~25 + x"24 + x~21 
+ x~19 + x~17 + x~13 + x-10)*Y"6 + (x~41 + x~40 + x~36 + x~33 + 
x~32 + x~25 + x~22 + x~18 + x~15 + x~12)*Y~5 + (x~47 + x~45 + x~43 
+ x-42 + x-40 + x~37 + x~33 + x~32 + x~27 + x~26 + x~25 + x~22 + 
x~21 + x~19 + x~17 + x~16 + x~15 + x~14 + x~12 + x~7 + x~6)*Y~4 
+ (x~42 + x~39 + x~38 + x~35 + x~34 + x~33 + x~30 + x~29 + x"28 + 
x~27 + x~26 + x~25 + x~23 + x~21 + x~19 + x~16)*Y~3 + (x~48 + x~45 
+ x"44 + x"43 + x~42 + x~41 + x~40 + x~39 + x~38 + x~37 + x"36 + 
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x"35 + x~34 + x~32 + x~30 + x~27 + x~26 + x~25 + x"24 + x~22 + x*21 
+ x"20 + x~17 + x~14 + x~13 + x~ll + x~7)*Y~2 + (x~53 + x~51 + 
x~50 + x~40 + x~39 + x~38 + x~36 + x~35 + x~34 + x"33 + x~32 + x~30 
+ x~27 + x~25 + x~24 + x~20 + x~18 + x"16 + x~15 + x"14 + x~12 + 
x~9)*Y + x~60 + x~58 + x~57 + x~55 + x"54 + x~52 + x"49 + x~48 
+ x~47 + x"46 + x~45 + x~41 + x~39 + x"38 + x~35 + x~33 + x~30 
+ x~29 + x~28 + x~26 + x~23 + x~22 + x~21 + x~20 + x~19 + x~18 
+ x~17 + x~15 + x~14 + x~13 + x~12 + x~9 + x~7 + x"4 + 1 
Complete Factorization of above Product over KC[W]: 
[ 
<W + Y, 1>, 
<W + Y + x-2, 1>, 
<W + Y + t*x~2 + t~4*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~2*x~2 + t~6*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~3*x~2 + t~4*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~4*x~2 + t~3*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~5*x~2 + t~3*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~6*x~2 + t~6*x, 1>, 
<W + (t*x~3 + t~6*x~2 + t~6)/(x~9 + t~5*x~8 + t"2*x"7 + t*x"6 + 
t~2*x~5 + t~2*x~4)*Y~4 + (t"3*x~5 + t~3*x~4 + x~3 + t~3*x~2 + t"5*x 
+ t~3)/(x~7 + t~5*x~6 + t~2*x~5 + t*x~4 + t~2*x~3 + t~2*x~2)*Y~2 
+ (t*x~6 + t~5*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + t~5*x~3 + t~4*x~2 + t~3*x + 
t~5)/(x~6 + t"5*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + t*x~3 + t~2*x~2 + t~2*x)*Y + 
(t~6*x~12 + x~ll + t*x~10 + t~5*x~9 + t~6*x~8 + t~6*x~7 + t~3*x~6 + 
t~3*x~5 + x~4 + x~3 + x~2 + t~5*x + t~3)/(x~8 + t~2*x~6 + t~3*x~5 + 
t~4*x~4), 1>, 
<W + (t~3*x~3 + t~3*x~2 + t~6)/(x~9 + x~d + t~3*x~7 + x~6 + t"5*x~5 
+ t~6*x~4)*Y~4 + (t*x~5 + x~4 + t*x~3 + x"2 + t~5*x + t~3)/(x~7 
+ x~6 + t~3*x~5 + x~4 + t~5*x~3 + t~6*x"2)*Y~2 + (t*x~6 + t~2*x~5 + 
t*x~4 + t~3*x~3 + x + t~5)/(x~6 + x~5 + t~3*x~4 + x~3 + 
t~5*x~2 + t"6*x)*Y + (t*x~12 + t~2*x~ll + t~6*x~10 + t~3*x~9 + x"8 
+ x~7 + t~4*x~6 + t~6*x~5 + x~4 + t~2*x~3 + t~3*x~2 + t~5*x + 
f3)/(x~8 + t~4*x~7 + t~5*x~6 + t*x~5 + t*x~4), 1> 
] 
C is hyperelliptic. 
The product of a images of C has coefficient in k(x) and is completely factored in 
K(C). Therefore, K{C) is splitting field of nr=o ^(C) over k(x) and hence is Galois 
over it. Therefore it is meaningfull to talk about K(C)a = k(C). The equation of the 
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curve C is defined over K. However in [GHS02b] and [Hes04], there are algorithm to 
explicitly compute C such that C is defined over k as well. 
As deg(my) = 3, the equation of the curve is considered secure against GHS attack. 
However, there is no guarantee that one can not write K(E) with another equation 
whose deg(ra/) = 2. But 2 is the absolute lower bound. It is important to notice that 
the resulting curve is hyperelliptic. 
5.5.2 Case n = 7 
In this case we attacked Curve Y2 + xY + tx3 + t. K = k(t) such that t7 + t + 1. The 
factorization of the minimal polynomial of the Frobenius is not trivial as discussed in 
Section 5.3.2. Now f(x) := tx3 4-1. So the only coefficient is t, so rrif(t) = mt(t). Due 
to the result of Section 5.3.2, we know that mt(t) = t3 + t + 1 and that means that 
deg(mt(t)) = deg(m/(*)) = 3: 
Basic Parameters: p = 2 , r = l , n = 7 
Extending K/k with T~7 + T + 1 
The Original Curve under a t tack E i s : 
Y"2 + x*Y + t*x~3 + t 
Applying sigma" 1 results in equation 
wl~2 + x*wl + t~2*x~3 + t~2 
Applying sigma" 2 results in equation 
w2~2 + x*w2 + t~4*x~3 + t"4 
Compositon degree [K(C):K(E)] = 2" 2 
The genus of the function field K(C) is: 7 
C is Y~8 + (t~124*x~8 + t~23*x~7 + t~48*x~6 + t~71*x~5 + t~62*x~4)*Y-4 
+ (t"5*x-12 + t~84*x~il + t~61*x~10 + t~42*x~8 + t~48*x"7 + 
t-116*x"6)*Y"2 + (t~lll*x~14 4 t~103*x~13 + t~71*x~12 + t~113*x~ll + 
t~91*x~10 + t~73*x~9 + t~113*x~8 + t~123*x~7)*Y + t~98*x~20 + 
t~4*x~18 + t~121*x~17 + t~90*x~16 + t~59*x~15 + t~74*x~14 + t~75*x~13 
+ t~125*x~12 + t~102*x-il + t~126*x~10 + t-100*x~9 + t~34*x~7 
+ t-85*x~6 + t~31*x~5 + t~120*x~4 + t~47 
Prod_{i = l..n}Sigma(C(Y)) = 
Y~56 + (x~8 + x~4)*Y-52 + (x~ll + x"10 + x~8)*Y~50 + (x~14 + x~13 + 
x~9 + x~7)*Y~49 + (x~17 + x~16 + x"14 + x~ll + x~9 + x~6 + x~5 + 
l)*Y~48 + (x~19 + x~18 + x~16 + x~15 + x~14 + x~10)*Y~46 + (x~21 + 
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x~20 + x~19 + x~18 + x~15 + x~13 + x~12 + x~ll)*Y~45 + (x~28 + 
x~27 + x~26 + x~25 + x~23 + x~21 + x~20 + x~19 + x~16 + x~15 + x~14 
+ x~13 + x~12 + x~ll + x~10 + x~9 + x~8 + x~7 + x~6 + x~4)*Y~44 + 
$\vdots$ 
x~53 + x~52 + x~51 + x~50 + x~48 + x~47 + x~44 + x~43 + x~40 + x~37 
+ x~35 + x~34 + x~24 + x~19 + x"17 + x~15 + x"14 + x~13 + x~12 + 
x~ll + x~10 + x~8 + x~6 + x~5 + x~4 + 1 
Complete Factorization of above Product over KC[W]: 
[ 
<W + Y, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~5*x~2 + t~77*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~8*x~2 + t~125*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~68*x~2 + t~69*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~81*x~2 + t~102*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~86*x~2 + t~57*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~121*x~2 + t~55*x, 1>, 
<W + Y + t~123*x~2 + t~19*x, 1>, 
<W + (t~4*x~4 + t~57*x~3 + t~126*x~2 + t~27*x + t~91)/(x~10 + 
t~119*x~9 + t~87*x~8 + t~2*x~7 + t~107*x~6 + t~89*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + 
t~12*x~3)*Y~4 + (t"91*x-6 + t~34*x~5 + x~4 + t~35*x~2 + t~66*x + 
t~75)/(x~8 + t~119*x~7 + t~87*x~6 + t~2*x~5 + t~107*x-4 + 
t~89*x~3 + t~2*x~2 + t~12*x)*Y~2 + (t~99*x~7 + t~85*x~6 + t~103*x~5 
+ t~48*x~4 + t~2*x~3 + t~78*x~2 + t~54*x + t~113)/(x~7 + 
t~119*x~6 + t~87*x~5 + t"2*x~4 + t~107*x~3 + t~89*x~2 + t"2*x + 
t~12)*Y + (t~53*x~14 + t~56*x~13 + t~25*x~12 + t"99*x~ll + 
t~83*x~10 + t~22*x~9 + t~78*x~8 + t~39*x~7 + t~110*x~6 + t~109*x~5 
+ t~64*x~4 + t"96*x"3 + t~9*x~2 + f~114*x + t~51)/(x~10 + 
t~119*x~9 + t~87*x~8 + t~2*x~7 + t"107*x"6 + t~89*x~5 + t"2*x~4 + 
t-12*x~3), 1>, 
<W + (t~106*x~4 + t~38*x~3 + t~35*x~2 + t~61*x + t~92)/(x~10 + 
t~119*x~9 + t~87*x~8 + t~2*x~7 + t~107*x~6 + t~89*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + 
t~12*x~3)*Y~4 + (t~21*x~6 + t~123*x~5 + t~84*x~4 + t~114*x~2 + 
t"38*x + t~92)/(x~8 + t~119*x~7 + t~87*x~6 + t~2*x~5 + t~107*x~4 
+ t~89*x~3 + t~2*x~2 + t~12*x)*Y~2 + (t~40*x~7 + t~126*x~6 + 
t~50*x~5 + t"62*x~4 + t~118*x"3 + t~lll*x~2 + t~118*x)/(x~7 + 
t~119*x~6 + t~87*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + t~107*x~3 + t~89*x~2 + t~2*x 
+ t"12)*Y + (t~28*x~14 + t~22*x~13 + t~83*x~12 + fl24*x~ll + 
t~50*x~10 + t~26*x~9 + t~67*x~8 + t~57*x~7 + t~121*x-6 + t~58*x~5 
+ t~59*x~4 + t~29*x~3 + t~119*x~2 + t~21*x + t~52)/(x~10 + 
t~119*x~9 + t~87*x~8 + t~2*x~7 + t~107*x~6 + t~89*x~5 + t~2*x~4 + 
t~12*x~3), 1> 
] 
C is NOT hyperelliptic. 
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The resulting curve is of degree 23 instead of secure degree 27 and therefore this 
curve is not secure for cryptographic purpose. K{C) is not hyperelliptic which means 
that the implementation of index calculus attack against k(C) is not as efficient as the 
hyperelliptic case. 
5.5.3 Case n = 31 
We attack the curve Y2 + xY + x3 +1 defined over K = k(t) such that t3l + t2 + 1 = 0 
so n = 31. f(x) = x3 + t . The coefficients are l,t and rrif(t) = [m\,mt\. m\ = t + 1 
as Probenius fix 1. mt(t) = = t5 -j- t2 + 1 using result from Section 5.3.3. Therefoe 
mf(t) == [t + l,f5 + t2 + 1] = (t + l)(t5 + t2 + 1) therefore deg(my) = 6. Knowing 
these facts we can run the attack: 
Basic Parameters: p = 2 , r = l , n = 3 1 
Extending K/k with T~31 + T~3 + 1 
The Original Curve under attack E i s : 
Y~2 + x*Y + x~3 + t 
Applying sigma" 1 results in equation 
wl~2 + x*wl + x~3 + t~2 
Applying sigma" 2 results in equation 
w2"2 + x*w2 + x~3 + f~4 
Applying sigma" 3 results in equation 
w3"2 + x*w3 + x"3 + t~8 
Applying sigma" 4 results in equation 
w4"2 + x*w4 + x"3 + t~16 
Applying sigma" 5 results in equation 
w5~2 + x*w5 + x"3 + t"4 + t 
Compositon degree [K(C):K(E)] = 2" 5 
The genus of the function field K(C) is: 31 
C is Y~64 + Y\"{}32((t"30 + t~29 + t"28 + t"27 + t"26 + t"22 + t~21 
+ t"20 + t~18 + t"17 + t"15 + t~12 + t"7 + t + l)*x"64 + (t~29 + 
t"26 + t"25 + t~22 + t"21 + 
(t"27 + t"26 + t~24 + t~22 + t"17 + t~16 + t~15 + t~9 + t~8 + 
t"7 + t~6 + t"5 + t~2)*x~33 + (t~29 + t"25 + t~24 + t~23 + t~21 + 
t~18 + t~14 + t~12 + t~10 + t~7 + t~6 + t~5 + t"4 + t"2 + t + l)*x~32 
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+ t~27 + t~24 + t~23 + t~22 + t~20 + t~19 + t"16 + t~13 + t~7 + 
t~6 + t~4 + t 
The result is a curve of degree 64 = 26, However a secure curve should result in a 
curve of degree 230 = 1073741824. Therefore this curve is significantly less secure than 
it is expected to be. 

CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion and Further Work 
A decade has been passed since introduction of the idea of the GHS method. During 
this decade, the attack was improved from a mere idea to a standard technique to attack 
curves defined over composite fields. The progress of the GHS attack also influenced 
other area of cryptography and algorithmic number theory such as hyperelliptic curve 
cryptography, algorithmic study of class group of algebraic curves and function fields. 
The purpose of this work was to study the GHS attack in more general form, both 
from theoretical and practical view. We presented the basic foundation of GHS attack, 
namely solving the discrete logarithm over jacobian of a general curve. Then we de-
scribed the theoretical aspect of GHS attack to an elliptic curve defined over a finite 
field of arbitrary characteristics. 
We then studied more practical aspects of the GHS attack. In this stage, we re-
stricted ourselves to even characteristic and we considered more general quadratic ex-
tensions than [Hes04]. We showed that the same method of <x-polynomial that is used 
in [Hes04] can be used to analyze the degree of the extension K{C) and we devel-
oped an upper bound for the genus of K(C). We also studied the structure of K as a 
F2[i]—module and we gave an algorithm to find the least secure elements of a composite 
field for the GHS attack. 
Finally, we brought the implementation of the main algorithms described in this 
paper along with the example of computational results of these algorithms. 
The fundamental idea behind the GHS attack, namely mapping the DLP over the 
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jacobian of a curve to an easier instance of DLP over jacobian of another curve using 
the relationship between their function fields, is vast and has the potential of deeper 
studies. 
By studying the inverse image of the factor base of the CI°(CQ), it could be possible 
to find a method to build a factor base for elliptic curve DLP. Similar approach using 
Weil Descent idea (the geometric parallel of the GHS) is studied in [Gau04]. 
Because of the GHS attack, it is now standard to avoid composite finite fields for 
elliptic curve cryptography. It would be interesting to extend some of ideas of the 
GHS to attack other cases of the DLP. True subfield curves used over a large prime 
extensions, such as Koblitz curves [HMV03] are still in use and attract considerable 
interest due to their performance. The method described in this work is not applicable 
to these curves. However, considering other isogenous curve may lead to an efficient 
attack against these curves. Partial work on this issue has been done in [DS03]. 
Optimal Extension Fields (OEFs) [HMV03], are extensions of a prime fields whose 
characteristics occupies all most one machine words (e.g. 64 bits). These fields are also 
known to have efficient finite field operation algorithm. The study of the GHS attack 
against curves defined over these fields is also an interesting problem. 
The above examples are a few open problems centered on the study of the GHS 
attack. The final word is that the GHS attack opened the flood-gates for the use 
function field arithmetic in cryptography. 
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